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ABSTRACT 
DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF  
AKP GOVERNMENT AND DSP-MHP-ANAP COALITION 
 
 
AYŞE KESLER 
 
Master of Arts in Political Science & Conflict Analysis and Resolution,  
MA Thesis, 2005 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Nimet Beriker 
 
  
Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy change, foreign policy 
continuity, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP [Justice and Welfare Party], 
Demokratik Sol Parti DSP [Democratic Left Party] 
 
This thesis assumes a substantial change in the Turkish foreign policy, specifically 
in the traditionally “sensitive” policy areas such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, 
Turkish- Greek relations and those with the EU. Therefore, the study aims to analyze 
the dynamics of foreign policy restructuring. For this purpose, foreign policy actions of 
the ruling AKP government and its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition are 
compared and contrasted for illustrating the causes and dynamics of policy changes.  
Literature on foreign policy restructuring cites three general factors affecting 
governments’ decisions to redirect their foreign policy intentions and actions that 
explain change and continuity of a state’s external relations: 1. International, 2. 
Domestic, and 3. those relating political agency and decision-making process.  
Based on the comparative case findings, the analysis shows that domestic factors 
most influence foreign policy change: low regime vulnerability, together with a high 
level of political cohesiveness, and a novel orientation to foreign policy, positively 
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impact foreign policy change. From those relating to political agency and decision-
making, a strong leadership is predicted positively with the cohesiveness factor. Low 
level of opposition and polarization, as well as decision-making process, however, show 
no impact on foreign policy change. The study reveals that international factors are not 
a decisive factor for change per se but can be meaningful depending on the nature and 
stage of the development; the impact of international factors is found issue specific. As 
a final point, dimensions of domestic regime change and bureaucratic rigidity were not 
found applicable for this research. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE’DE DIŞ POLİTİKANIN BOYUTLARI:  
AKP HÜKÜMETİ VE DSP-MHP-ANAP KOALİSYONU’NUN 
 KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ 
 
 
AYŞE KESLER 
 
Siyaset Bilimi & Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans,  
Sanatta Yeterlilik Tezi, 2005 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Nimet Beriker 
 
  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, dış politika değişimi, dış politika 
devamlılığı, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), 
Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)  
 
 
 
 
Bu tez Türk dış politikasının “hassas” konuları olarak nitelendirilen Ermeni 
meselesi, Kıbrıs sorunu, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkiler gibi dış 
politika alanlarında son dönemlerde siyasi davranış değişikliklerinin söz konusu olduğu 
varsayımına dayanmaktadır. Bu yüzden, çalışmanın amacı günümüz Türk dış 
politikasındaki yeniden yapılandırma  dinamiklerini incelemektir. Bu çalışma, mevcut 
dış politika değişikliklerinin sebeplerini ve dinamiklerini tanımlamak amacıyla 
iktidardaki AKP hükümeti ve bir önceki DSP-MHP-ANAP koalisyonunun dış politika 
aksiyonlarını karşılaştırmakta ve kıyaslamaktadır.  
Dış politikanın yeniden yapılandırılması literatürü, hükümetlerin dış politika niyet 
ve aksiyonlarında yön değiştirme kararlarını etkileyen ve devletin dış ilişkilerinde 
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değişim ve sürekliliği açıklayan üç genel etkene yer vermektedir: 1. Uluslararası 
faktörler, 2. İç politika faktörleri ve 3. Siyasi temsil ve karar alma süreciyle ile ilgili 
olan faktörler.  
Karşılaştırmalı vaka araştırması bulgularına dayanarak yapılan analiz, dış politika 
değişimini en çok iç politika faktörlerinin etkilediğini göstermiştir: düşük rejim 
zedelenirliği, yüksek seviyede siyasi bağlılık ve dış politikaya yönelik yeni ve farklı bir 
oryantasyonla birleşince dış politika değişimi üzerinde olumlu bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. 
Siyasi temsil ve karar alma süreciyle ilgili unsurlar arasından güçlü liderlik, siyasi 
bağlılıkla olumlu bir etkileşim içindedir. Muhalefetin ve kutuplaşmanın seviyesi ile 
karar alma süreci dış politika değişimi üzerinde hiç etki göstermemişlerdir. Çalışma salt 
uluslararası faktörlerin dış politika değişimi için belirleyici olmadığını, ancak 
gelişmenin doğası ve aşamasına bağlı olarak anlamlı olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. 
Böylelikle uluslararası faktörlerin etkisi duruma özeldir. Son olarak, incelenen vakalar 
için iç politikadaki rejim değişimi ve bürokratik bükülmezlik boyutları uygulanabilir 
bulunmamıştır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During one state’s course of foreign policy, various changes can take place. Some 
of these changes in external relations are minor and/or gradual whereas others, major 
and/or sudden. This research is interested in offering a further understanding to the 
study of foreign policy transformation within the context of contemporary Turkish 
foreign relations. For this purpose, foreign policy actions of the ruling AKP government 
and its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition are analyzed by addressing the 
following questions.  
1. What has changed with AKP’s foreign policy compared to that of the previous 
Turkish government? What happened in Turkish Foreign Policy before and after 
AKP?  
2. What causes change in foreign policy? What are the dynamics of such a change?  
This study relies upon the fore mentioned assumptions that there has been a 
change in Turkish foreign policy with AKP Government, so the basic aim is to analyze 
the dynamics under which this change took place, by employing foreign policy 
restructuring literature.  
Turkish foreign policy actors have been generally following a status quo approach 
and positional attitude in major foreign policy issues of the country such as the 
Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish- Greek relations, and relations with the EU, 
issues which were causing major obstacles in Turkey’s integration with the international 
community. AKP’s predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was again not an exception 
to the rule: based on the Coalition Protocol1 and the Program of the Government2, the 
coalition partners set EU membership as a goal, but underlined that they would not 
                                                 
1 http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/57hprotokol.html 
2 http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/57-1.html 
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make any compromises concerning national rights or interests. Following the traditional 
line in Turkish foreign policy, DSP-MHP-ANAP declared a continuation with the 
policies protecting and improving the already gained rights of Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. Accordingly, the coalition partners gave for example their full support 
to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş, who walked away from the table of UN sponsored 
talks for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. For the improvement of relations with 
Greece and Armenia, DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition laid down rather offensive 
preconditions in their Government Program such as, for Greece, to stop supporting 
terror acts in Turkey, or, for Armenia, to stop the invasion in Azerbaijan.  
 However, it can be claimed that with the current AKP Government, Turkish 
foreign policy underwent a shift in the above listed traditionally ‘sensitive’ foreign 
policy issues. Initiating with the Program of the 58th Government3 of November 2002, 
AKP has been employing a different tone regarding foreign policy: reaffirming the full 
membership to the EU as Turkey’s main goal, AKP underlined its decisiveness for 
fulfilling the conditions and working for opening of accession negotiations. Concerning 
the relations with Greece, AKP assured continuing to build ground for the resolution of 
political conflicts. Most notably, the Government Program called for finding a solution 
of the Cyprus Conflict by all means. In this framework, policy initiatives have been 
taken such as the full support to the Annan Plan in Cyprus. Although AKP made no 
special reference to the Armenian issue in its Program, in practice, it again showed a 
problem solving approach by offering to the international community unlimited access 
to Turkish historical resources for investigation of Armenian allegations. Thus, the 
foreign policy orientation of AKP deviated considerably from its predecessor, DSP-
MHP-ANAP coalition. 
The following study endeavors to compare AKP’s foreign policy with the 
previous government’s foreign policy with the aim of demonstrating the causes of the 
changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation on the above mentioned  sensitive 
foreign policy issues.  
                                                 
3 Summary translation made by the author. For the entire text in Turkish language, 
please look at: http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-3.html 
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The cases for comparative case study were selected on the basis of their 
contemporary nature, and with the aim of highlighting the change of foreign policy 
concerning the country’s major issues in the context of subsequent governments4. 
The study furthermore aims to contribute to the existing theoretical literature on 
foreign policy restructuring by applying the analytical dimensions derived from the 
literature to the Turkish context and analyzing their individual impact on the 
transformation of the Turkish foreign policy. 
For studying the causes and dynamics of foreign policy change, foreign policy 
restructuring literature is employed, which provides a list of analytic dimensions to map 
out such a change. Further in this chapter, the literature on foreign policy restructuring 
will be introduced.  
In Chapter Two Introductory Chapter on Turkish Foreign Policy, important 
milestones and foreign policy developments with the accompanying domestic 
background from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until 1999 will be 
illustrated.  
Chapter Three Analysis and Application 57th Government of Turkey, presents an in 
depth analysis of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government’s foreign policy along the 
analytical dimensions derived from the literature review in Chapter 1, whereas Chapter 
Four Analysis and Application 58th and 59th Governments of Turkey, applies the same 
analysis along the same dimensions to AKP Government’s course of foreign policy. My 
timeframe for the comparative case study covers the period from 18 April 1999 
Elections until 29 May 2005, which was the end of the data gathering process.  
Finally, Chapter Five Findings and Conclusion attempts to answer the above 
stated research questions. It summarizes the main findings of our comparative case 
study and offers a refinement to the existing foreign policy restructuring literature.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The limitation concerning the case selection for this comparative case study is that 
DSP-MHP-ANAP was a coalition government, while AKP governs Turkey as a single 
party. Despite the difference of the type of government, for the purposes of this study, 
i.e. focusing on foreign policy change, the two cases were compared and contasted. 
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Literature Review 
 
 
Although foreign policy has evolved as a separate field of study under the political 
science/ international relations umbrella starting from 1960s and 1970s, foreign policy 
change or restructuring is still insufficiently explored phenomena and there is a limited 
literature available on them. Aside from some early attempts, the literature on foreign 
policy has predominantly developed focusing rather on conditions for stability than 
change. Academic interest on foreign policy change, evident only after the 1990s, was 
to a certain extent due to the new realities at international arena. The end of Cold War 
and the emergence of remarkable changes in world affairs led to a reorientation in 
foreign policies of many states. Thus, the concept of foreign policy restructuring started 
to receive increasingly more attention in the scholarly literature.  
One of the early works regarding the study of foreign policy change is James 
Rosenau’s The Study of Political Adaptation (1981)5. In his work, Rosenau argues that 
foreign policy is essentially an adaptation mechanism for nation-states to changes in 
their environments. Thus, foreign policy changes are most likely to occur when new 
needs and demands occur both domestically and externally.  
A significant milestone in the foreign policy change literature is taken by Kal 
Holsti’s Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World 
(1982)6. Holsti’s contribution is crucial in defining and explaining why foreign policy 
restructuring occurs. He differentiates normal foreign policy change, which is slow and 
incremental from foreign policy restructuring, which is quick, non-incremental and 
fundamental. Holsti addresses why foreign policy restructuring occurs and under which 
conditions. He concludes that foreign policies of smaller, developing and more 
peripheral states are more likely to experience such a major shift. 
                                                 
5 Rosenau, J. N. 1981. The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of 
World Politics. New York: Nichols Publishing. 
6 Holsti, K. J. (ed.) 1982. Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the 
Postwar World. London: Allen and Unwin. 
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In his work Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: the Problems and 
Possibilities of Détente (1988)7, Kjell Goldmann examines the contradictory tendency 
of states to adapt to changing conditions on one hand and to stick to previous policies 
on the other. He deals with the question of change and stability in foreign policy and its 
effect on the process of détente between US and USSR.  
The article Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign 
Policy by Charles Hermann (1990)8 adds to the literature on foreign policy 
restructuring, the role of the decision process for foreign policy change. According to 
Hermann, policymakers can either anticipate the changes in their environment; respond 
just in time or after suffering dramatic consequences. Furthermore, policymakers have 
the capacity to act as agents of change. 
The edited volume Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to 
Global Change by Rosati, Hagan and Sampson III (1994)9 is one of the rare sources, 
which deals extensively with the concept of foreign policy restructuring from a 
theoretical perspective. It is one of the most recent and most comprehensive additions to 
this literature. This volume attempts to answer the following three research questions: 
1. What is foreign policy change and restructuring? 
2. What are the sources of foreign policy change? What bodies of theoretical 
knowledge and thought contribute to an understanding of foreign policy change? 
3. To what extent does the study of change and restructuring contribute to an 
understanding of foreign policy and international relations? 
In this volume, Volgy and Schwarz (1994) define the concept of foreign policy 
restructuring as “a fundamental and comprehensive change in foreign policy orientation 
of a nation, over a very short period of time, as manifested through behavioral changes 
in a nation’s interactions with other actors in international politics”10.  
This definition implies the following series of properties: 
                                                 
7 Goldmann, K. 1988. Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: the Problems and 
Possibilities of Détente. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
8 Hermann, C. F. 1990. “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect 
Foreign Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 34:3. 
9 Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). 1994. Foreign Policy 
Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press. 
10 Volgy, T. J. and Schwarz, J. E. 1994. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad 
Webs of Restraint.” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press., p.25. 
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 Multidimensional change/co variation in behavior; e.g. change in verbal behavior in 
trade, in organizational activity, in diplomatic behavior. 
 Focus on behavioral manifestations of change, i.e. intentions of change are ignored. 
 Inclusive nature: at least two broad types of changes are included:  
i) Changes in policy direction, ii) Changes in participation 
 Temporal dimension: incremental changes excluded 
 Threshold value of the quantity of change: minor changes excluded  
Thus, three basic factors, which affect the nature of foreign policy change and 
restructuring, are the level, scope, and time frame of change. 
There are forces inside and outside the state, which hold back such major changes 
occurring in foreign policy. According to Volgy and Schwarz, these forces can be 
categorized as bureaucratic, regime, resource, global and regional webs of restraint. 
Rosati (1994) puts forward a theoretical model for understanding the dynamics of 
continuity and change in foreign policy. According to his model,  
Foreign policy is a cyclical process in the sense that it tends to experience 
continuity which is eventually interrupted by change, followed by another period 
of continuity that eventually again will be interrupted by change. The cyclical 
nature of the process develops from the interaction of the state, the society and the 
environment, which generally acts to produce a political process that reinforces 
continuity, but which also, eventually produces contradictions to the status quo 
that contribute to change.11  
 
                                                 
11  Rosati, J.A. 1994. “Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring, The Politics of 
Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and 
Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to 
Global Change, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.222. 
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Rosati illustrates his model with the following figure12: 
Figure I: Rosati’s Cyclical Model of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy. 
 
   Period of Stability 
(Equilibrium)     Foreign Policy Continuity 
Politics of the Status Quo 
 
   
 Period of Transition 
 (Disequilibrium)                                     Foreign Policy Change 
 Politics of Adjustment 
 
 
According to Rosati, bureaucracy, high level policy makers, political systems with 
varying degrees, international patterns and constraints, such as agreements, 
commitments, commercial relationships as well as international law and regulations 
constitute sources of stability and foreign policy continuity, whereas maladaptive policy 
and crises lead to transition and foreign policy change.  
Foreign policy patterns resulting from a period of transition can range from 
intensification, meaning no or little change, to refinement covering minor changes or 
reform that includes moderate changes until restructuring, which implies major changes. 
Hagan and Rosati (1994) propose that in order to explain foreign policy change, multi 
causal explanations should be taken into account, which reflect the complex interplay of 
governmental, domestic, and international factors. According to the authors, the third 
mechanism of foreign policy change, the policy making process, is best viewed within 
the context of the other two sources of foreign policy as diagrammed below13. 
                                                 
12 ibid. p. 227 
13 Hagan, J. D. and Rosati, J. A. 1994 “Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy 
Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press., p.272. 
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Figure II: Hagan and Rosati’s Multi causal Explanations for Foreign Policy 
Change 
Change in 
International Position 
     The     Foreign  
     Policymaking     Policy 
     Process    Change  
Change in Domestic   
Political Alignments  
 
 
 
Pressure for FP Restructuring   Conditions for FP responses 
 
For Hagan (1994), the effect of domestic factors on foreign policy change is of 
crucial importance. One of the sources of foreign policy restructuring is domestic 
political regime change, which implies that a new leadership group or coalition of 
groups comes to power and takes control of the authoritative policy making bodies of 
the government. Hagan makes a typology of domestic regime change as follows:  
Type I: A change in the predominant leader 
Type II: A major factional or coalition shift 
Type III: A regular exchange of power between contending mainstream parties and 
groups 
Type IV: A political revolution bringing to power an “antisystem” group or coalition.14 
According to Hagan, a domestic regime change leads to foreign policy 
restructuring only under the conditions when political actors with different orientations 
to foreign affairs come to power and the new regime enjoys a political cohesiveness. 
Here, political cohesiveness refers to coherence and consistency among those who 
represent the new regime about the foreign policy orientation. Foreign policy 
restructuring is further effected by political system conditions such as the strength of 
                                                 
14 Hagan, J. D. 1994 “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy 
Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press., pp. 144-146. 
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political opposition to the regime, the level of polarization over foreign policy issues, 
regime vulnerability, and political system structure, i.e. the degree of accountability and 
institutionalization of the new regime. 
Hagan puts forward the following dimensions of foreign policy restructuring: 
 Accommodation vs. Confrontation: “This dimension refers to a regime’s 
propensity to deal with adversaries through diplomatic bargaining as opposed to 
confrontational strategies….”15 
 Independence/Interdependence of Action vs. Contacts/Multilateral Ties: “This 
dimension is the degree of autonomy a government tries to maintain in its 
foreign policy actions.”16 
 Level of Commitment: “…refers to the degree to which current actions limit 
future options.”17 
The most recent contribution to the literature on foreign policy restructuring is 
Jakob Gustavsson’s “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change” (1999). The 
author reviews six different models including those of Hermann, Rosati and Goldmann 
that have been designed to explain why governments occasionally choose to make 
radical changes in their foreign policies and presents a model on his own, which he 
applies to the Swedish Government’s 1990 reorientation on membership in the 
EC/EU18. In brief, Gustavsson argues that the field should focus on the simultaneous 
occurrence of changes in fundamental structural conditions, strategic political 
leadership, and the presence of a crisis of some kind. 
There is a shared understanding among the authors of foreign policy restructuring 
literature that a “need exists for a synthesis and the development of an integrative 
theory”19, which “observes the combined importance of international and domestic 
structural conditions, political agency and the decision-making process.”20 
 
                                                 
15 ibid., p. 157 
16 ibid., p. 158 
17 ibid., p. 159 
18 Gustavsson J. 1999. “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” Cooperation 
and Conflict, Sage Publications, 34: 1, pp. 73-95. 
19 Hagan, J. D. and Rosati, J. A. “Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy 
Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press., p.275. 
20 Gustavsson J. 1999. “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” Cooperation 
and Conflict, Sage Publications, 34: 1, p. 92. 
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Operational Definitions of Analytical Dimensions 
 
 
The literature review above suggests that there are three main factors that affect 
foreign policy restructuring. The first two factors consist of independent variables that 
can lead to a dramatic change in foreign policy, while the third factor involves 
intervening variables that would restrain such a change21: 
A. International Factors 
B. Domestic Factors 
C. Political Agency and Decision-making Process 
Based on the above general categories, Table I below summarizes the analytical 
dimensions which will be applied to the two cases in order to analyze foreign policy 
restructuring of the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and the current AKP 
government. 
                                                 
21 The literature review suggests that the trigger for foreign policy change is most likely 
to come from international or domestic factors. However, it is important to note that 
political agency and decision-making process may also be sources to initiate a change 
under special circumstances. For example, depending on the style of a leader, a foreign 
policy change can be triggered by leadership. 
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Table I: Summary Table of Analytical Dimensions of Analysis 
A. International Factors 
a.1. Change in Systemic Conditions 
a.2. Regional Developments  
a.3. Foreign Commitments 
B. Domestic Factors 
b.1. Domestic Regime Change 
b.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy 
b.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime 
b.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime 
b.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues 
b.6. Regime Vulnerability 
C. Political Agency and  
Decision-making Process 
c.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity 
c.2. Leadership Dynamics 
c.3. Decision-making Process 
A: International factors are comprised of (1) changes in systemic conditions, (2) 
foreign commitments, and, (3) regional developments.  
a. 1. : Changes in systemic conditions reveal significant developments and 
alterations concerning the existing international system. These may include changes in 
the type of polarity such as from bipolar to multi polar in the post Cold War era, or such 
developments like September 11th, which led to unilateral acts of a hegemonic power.  
“The type of global system existing at any point in time may restrict or enhance the 
flexibility of states and their decision-makers to change the direction of their foreign 
policies”22. For example, it is more likely for governments to make a foreign policy 
                                                 
22 Volgy, T. J. and Schwarz, J. E. 1994. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad 
Webs of Restraint.” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
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restructuring in the context of a multi polar system as compared to the bipolar system as 
during the period of Cold War, since conditions of multi polarity increase the flexibility 
of all actors for deviating from hegemonic leadership of superpowers. 
a. 2. : In addition to global considerations, regional developments are on the 
agendas of governments. Regional developments include factors such as “the degree of 
regional integration and competition as well as the existence and intensity of a regional 
conflict”23. For example, especially since the end of the Cold War, governments 
increasingly became more conscious of their regional roles, which can be considered as 
a source for foreign policy restructuring. Developments such as the enlargement of the 
EU or the two Gulf Wars can be considered as examples for regional developments. 
a. 3. : Foreign commitments are the international ties of governments, usually with 
legal consequences, that shape the foreign policy being followed. “Commitment refers 
to the degree to which current actions limit future options”24 through the allocation of 
resources or the generation of expectations in others. Examples of major foreign 
commitments are the signing or breaking agreements or deployment of resources abroad 
(military forces or foreign aid). Lesser commitments rest on verbal behaviors such as 
promises and threats to act. Governments have national resources at hand to fulfill their 
commitments.  
B: Domestic factors include (1) domestic regime change, (2) different orientations 
to foreign policy, (3) political cohesiveness of the new regime, (4) strength of political 
opposition to the regime, (5) level of polarization over foreign policy issues, and (6) 
regime vulnerability.  
b. 1. : Domestic regime change involves an exchange of governing power between 
contending groups in a state. According to Hagan (1994)25, this exchange may take a 
variety of forms ranging from revolutions to a regular change of government through 
elections. A new government can provide a potential ground for a foreign policy 
restructuring, if the government represents a coherent set of novel ideas and different 
orientations to foreign policy, and if these ideas are shared by the members of the 
government.  
                                                 
23 ibid. p.35. 
24 Hagan, J. D. 1994 “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy 
Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). Foreign 
Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change, Columbia: 
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25 ibid., pp. 143-146. 
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b. 2. : Different orientations to foreign policy involve a new set of policy 
preferences and strategies of the new regime in power for dealing with foreign policy 
issues, if the new regime differs from its predecessor on the identification and 
assessment of threats and issues. According to Hagan (1994), “it is, in effect, the 
‘national interest’ of the country as defined by the group or coalition currently in 
power”26. 
b. 3. : Political cohesiveness of the new regime entails coherence and consistency 
among those who represent the new regime about the foreign policy orientation. Here, 
the type of government, i.e. whether the government is formed by a single party or a 
coalition of different political parties, plays an important role.  
b. 4. : A strong political opposition can also be a source affecting foreign policy 
change. It is useful to consider the strength and intensity of opposition, i.e. dissenting 
actors with the ruling party about foreign policy preferences. Political opposition 
institutional in character is performed by the opposition party, the legislature, the 
military etc. The ability of the new regime to retain power over the long term usually 
necessitates support of these institutions. Political pressures of the opposition may point 
to constraining as well as inducing effects. 
b. 5. : According to Hagan (1994)27 the level of polarization over foreign policy 
issues concerns the extent to which actors in a regime and opposition have substantive 
differences over foreign policy issues. The level of polarization asks whether there is a 
consensus on the basic identification of threats and problems facing the state and on the 
basic strategies for coping with those threats. Political constraints are further intensified 
as foreign policy debates become tied up with the political competition for office.  
b. 6. : Regime vulnerability concerns the threats at systemic level to the existing 
political system structure, which involves structural arrangements and political norms 
governing the relationship of the government with the opposition and the wider polity, 
and the threats to territorial integrity such as terrorist acts. For example, the potential 
risk that a government could lose its office increases the level of regime vulnerability. 
This removal may be caused by political opposition challenging the control of the new 
                                                 
26 ibid. p. 146. 
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government such as the military, or by the political uncertainty within the government 
itself such as losing support of factions or coalition members.  
C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process entails (1) bureaucratic rigidity, 
(2) leadership dynamics, and (3) decision-making process.  
c. 1. : Bureaucratic rigidity concerns policy incrementalism, which holds back a 
government’s ability to transform foreign policy. “Much of the conduct of foreign 
policy is a function of bureaucracy which tends to act as a major source of continuity 
over time”28, i.e. for the maintenance of the status quo.  Bureaucratic rigidity is likely to 
lead to a difference of opinion between the government and the bureaucrats over foreign 
policy issues and may reveal itself in form of criticizing, procrastinating or even 
hindering of government’s actions by the bureaucracy. 
c. 2. : Leadership dynamics involve the position and influence of a political party 
leader within his or her party. This factor is central for governmental political processes 
at a micro level as a condition for the implementation: a strong leadership, meaning a 
leader with a high support of his party members, is more likely to have the capacity for 
implementing a comprehensive change in foreign policy, while a weak leadership 
inhibits the possibilities for foreign policy restructuring.  
c. 3. : Decision-making process concerns the way how foreign policy decisions are 
made at a micro level29. Policy changes usually occur after entering and passing through 
a decision-making process, where policymakers launch a political proposal, place the 
new policy option on the political agenda and manipulate the political process by acting 
in a strategic way, in order to bring about the desired outcome. The decisions 
concerning foreign policy restructuring may be made on a participatory basis, i.e. by 
involving various policymakers into the process, or in a more authoritarian way, i.e. the 
process may be dominated by one policymaker or a group of policymakers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
This chapter briefly describes the major foreign policy issues faced by Turkey and 
the corresponding policies and orientations followed by Turkish foreign policy makers, 
for the period starting from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until mid 
1999, parallel to important landmarks concerning the domestic as well as international 
political environment. In this period,  
Turkey has faced four major foreign policy challenges. The first, in the early and 
mid 1920s, saw the challenge of consolidating the emerging state of Turkey, 
especially through external recognition; the second came with the Second World 
War and the need to remain outside of a conflict that raged all around, spanning 
most of Europe and the Middle East; the third came with the territorial and 
security challenge from the Soviet Union, especially during the early period of the 
Cold War; and the fourth coincided with the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of bipolarity, and the need to navigate carefully through the transitional period in 
the international system30.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, this lengthy period is chronologically divided into three 
subsequent phases, taking the Cold War as the turning point affecting Turkey’s 
contemporary history. Hence, the following pages demonstrate the essentials of Turkish 
foreign policy before, during, and after the Cold War era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Robins, P. 2003. Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War. 
London: Hurst& Company. p. 1. 
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Turkish Foreign Policy before the Cold War 
 
 
For many countries, one of the most important foreign policy objectives 
throughout history has been security, i.e. protecting the independence and sovereignty 
of their country from foreign threats. This goal has been particularly significant for 
Turkey, because its mere existence was threatened in the aftermath of World War I. 
Turkey has emerged as a completely sovereign state only after fighting a War of 
Independence and signing a new peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, with the 
victorious powers of World War I. Thus, “the foreign policy objectives of this new state 
- the Republic of Turkey- were very much colored by the experiences and the hardships 
that it underwent to claim its independence and territorial integrity”31.  
Turkish foreign policy from 1923 until the end of World War II in 1945 is usually 
characterized as “cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the status 
quo and the hard won victory of 1923”32. In this period, Turkey basically followed “a 
policy of neutrality in international disputes”33 to preserve its long sought 
independence. Furthermore, Ankara made serious efforts for improving its relations 
with neighboring countries throughout 1920s and 1930s, by signing friendship treaties 
and/ or forming various regional pacts and alliances based on the fundamental principle 
of ‘peace at home and peace in the world’ laid down by Republic’s founding father and 
the first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,.  
“Two basic issues dominated Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk years. The 
first was the Montreaux Treaty on the Straits (the Bosporus and Dardanelles). The 
second was the Hatay dispute”34. Both of these issues were leftovers from the Lausanne 
Treaty and resolved through modifications favoring Turkey’s interests. The Montreaux 
Treaty of 1936 replaced the collective security system run by the League of Nations, 
and acknowledged Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. Concerning the Hatay 
(Alexandretta) dispute, this territorial issue between France and Turkey was taken to the 
                                                 
31 Çelik, Y. 1999. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
p. 29. 
32 Zurcher, E. J. 1993. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 209. 
33 Çelik, Y. 1999. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
p. 30. 
34 Gültaşlı, S. & İlter, K. Turkish Foreign Policy in the 20th Century. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_02_00&d=probe&fn=FOR
EIGN.HTM lastly accessed on 1 May 2005. 
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League of Nations with the consent of the two parties, and resolved peacefully 
following the free elections and plebiscites held in Hatay, so that this territory 
eventually joined Turkey in 1939.  
World War II disrupted the favorable international conditions and Turkish foreign 
policy actors faced a more complicated picture during the World War II. “Ankara 
devoted considerable energy to stay out of the war, as it felt that the country was not 
ready militarily, economically, or politically to be involved in another major war so 
soon…Its strategy was termed ‘active neutrality’.”35 “Although İsmet İnönü, the 
Turkish President during the War, faced enormous pressure from the Allied Powers to 
take part in the war, he was able to save his country from having to participate in the 
war”36. Turkey succeeded in remaining neutral until the very end of World War II, and 
declared war on Germany and Japan in March 1945 for practical purposes, i.e. in order 
to be invited to the forthcoming United Nations Conference. Although Turkey’s 
wartime policies were strongly criticized by the Allied powers, the young Turkish 
Republic saw it as a great political success, asserting its independence and sovereignty 
while protecting its territorial integrity37. 
In this first period from 1923 to 1945, Turkey was a single party state run by 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People’s Party] except for the two very 
short-lived and unsuccessful multiparty democracy experiments. “Although the 1924 
Constitution placed all power in the Grand National Assembly as the only legitimate 
representative of the sovereign will of the nation… the voting … was not much more 
than a formality”38. Due to the authoritarian nature of the regime,  
…the decisions that were made during the 1923- 1945 period, especially foreign 
policy decisions, thus emanated from the upper echelons of the CHP. Foreign 
policy was not an area that was open to debate, and not even the opposition parties 
(during their brief existence) questioned the validity of the decisions taken by the 
CHP leadership in this area.39  
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Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War 
 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the 
strongest major powers; the world was divided into two conflicting camps led by each. 
Through the formation of this bipolar international system, foreign policy decision-
making in Turkey became largely defined by the role that Ankara played in the 
international system. The necessity of building close ties with the West in order to 
protect national security became apparent for Turkey as early as 1945 with growing 
Soviet demands. Turkish policy makers recognized that Turkey would only be able to 
avert the Soviet threat if it formed a close alliance with the other superpower, the United 
States. Washington welcomed Turkey’s alignment with the US by including Ankara in 
the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and further supporting it with substantial financial and 
military assistance through the Marshall Plan.  
The first important foreign policy goal of Turkey in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
was gaining admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was 
established in 1949. The then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes saw the Korean War as 
an opportunity to show Turkey’s allegiance with the Western bloc and sent Turkish 
troops there. Turkey finally joined NATO in 1952, so that Turkey’s role in the alliance 
for the next four decades became mainly serving as NATO’s southern flank and 
containing the Soviet threat.  
In the 1950s, Ankara entered into a number of regional alliances under the 
guidance of the Americans. One of them was the Balkan Pact formed in 1953 among 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The other one was the Baghdad Pact in 1955 with 
Britain, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, later transformed into the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) in 1960. Both of these regional alliances remained mere political gestures and 
were not strong and effective enough to deal with Cold War realities. 
A significant development in the European continent was the formation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which was augmented by the 
European Community (EC) with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Turkey, 
interpreted this regional cooperation development as a rational extension for 
consolidating its position as an integral part of the West, and submitted its application 
for membership as early as 1957. Turkey signed an Association Agreement, the so 
called Ankara Agreement with the EC in 1963, which outlined the terms and conditions 
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of Turkey’s association with the Community, and set three stages. The first stage 
(preparatory stage) moved forward without major problems and Turkish and European 
officials launched the second stage (transitional stage) in 1973. However, both Turkish 
inner political turmoil at that time and the severe economic crisis in the 1970s, prepared 
the ground for not making the necessary steps to accede to the next stage of the Ankara 
Agreement. As Turkey suspended its relations with the EC at the end of the 1970s and 
experienced another coup as early as 1980, Greece managed to become a full member 
of the Community in 1981, which created further difficulties in Ankara’s relationship 
with the Brussels. The normalization of the relations with the EC became possible 
gradually after the 1983 Elections in Turkey, and particularly after the submission of 
Turkish application for full membership in 1987 by the then Prime Minister Turgut 
Özal.  
Çelik (1999) argues that, this strictly Western oriented foreign policy behavior of 
Turkey during the Cold War years was interrupted first, during the eruption of the first 
Cyprus Crisis in 1963-64 and the second, in 1973-74. There were several reasons why 
Turkish foreign policy behavior strayed from its regular parameters during the Cyprus 
conflicts. The first crisis occurred at a time of détente between the superpowers, so 
Turkish policy makers felt more able to engage in foreign policy behavior that was 
independent from American interests. Consequently, the so called Johnson letter led to 
the realization that the US would not assist Turkey if its own security were not at stake. 
With this awareness, Ankara attempted to diversify Turkey’s foreign relations, e.g. 
Turkey became an associate member of the European Community in 1964. By the time 
that the second Cyprus Crisis occurred, therefore, Ankara was reevaluating the US 
commitments to Turkey and attempting to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, so 
Ankara acted against the advice of the US, carried out a military operation in 1974 and 
took control of the northern part of the island40.  
Despite these shifts in foreign policy behavior in the Cyprus context, increased 
Cold War hostilities in the late 1970s such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Iranian Revolution prompted Turkish foreign policy to be aligned once again with 
American interests. Thus, it may be concluded that for the most of the Cold War period 
Turkey remained Western in its foreign policy orientation.  
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Another major component of Turkish foreign policy that remained unwavering 
during the Cold War period was the desire to stay out of the conflicts of Middle Eastern 
region, except for the activist policy in the late 1950s in the context of the regional 
organization referred as the Baghdad Pact. Ankara remained strictly neutral during the 
Iran-Iraq War, and maintained diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Arab states. 
In sum, Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War can be characterized 
with the strategies of affiliation with the West and non-intervention in the Middle East. 
Regardless of the government in power, there has been a continuity and consensus 
among decision makers to follow a foreign policy based on the international 
commitments.  
Before 1989 international experts and practitioners tended to view Turkey as a bit 
player in a global game played between two blocs operating within one main 
international relations system. Turkey’s loyal membership to NATO and earnest 
desire to deepen its relations with the EC tended to confirm this impression.41 
The Cold War years also witnessed drastic changes in the Turkish domestic arena. 
It was not until the end of World War II that Turkey had its first real experience with 
multiparty democracy. Besides CHP, Demokrat Parti DP (Democratic Party) under the 
leadership of Adnan Menderes entered the political scene, caught the majority of 
electoral votes in 1950s and formed the government. With the entry of the DP into 
Turkish politics, the decision making arena expanded by including a diverse group of 
people such as industrialists, commercial groups, landed interests and the peasantry. 
Thus the different composition of the governing party reflected different priorities of the 
party-the focus on the liberalization and development of the Turkish economy- as well 
as the convergence of economic and foreign policy. Based on the merits of 
misgovernment and corruption, DP was removed from the office by the military coup 
d’état in May 1960.  
1961 Constitution marked a new era in Turkish politics with its emphasis on civil 
and political rights. Political movements and parties from each side of the political 
spectrum flourished, and the society started to polarize between leftist and rightist 
movements. This period showed a highly fragmented party system, which consequently 
led to numerous coalition governments. Economic crises of the 1970s added further 
complications to political problems of the country. Finally, the polarization and 
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insurgencies between political extreme groups, the highly fragile party system, and the 
economic problems added up to another military coup in September 1980. 
 
 
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
 
Fundamental changes have taken place in the structure of the international system 
with the end of the Cold War. The era of bipolarity came to an end following the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union. These developments had significant 
repercussions for many countries’ foreign policies including that of Turkey. The foreign 
policy arena was dominated by uncertainty and disagreement, which inevitably led to a 
search for a new foreign policy orientation. The changes in international system opened 
up new opportunities but also brought new challenges for Turkey.  
At first sight, the end of the Cold War seemed to reduce threats to Turkey’s 
national security and territorial integrity, since the immediate Soviet threat was lifted. 
Simultaneously, however, the collapse of the bipolar system brought some predictions 
that Turkey, whose place in the world had been defined by NATO membership and 
alliance with the US, had lost its strategic importance. Questions were raised about 
Turkey’s ability to handle its new position and multiregional geopolitical importance. 
With the end of Cold War,  
Turkey has gone from being a peripheral player in a global, bipolar conflict to 
being a central actor in a raft of actual or potential regional conflicts; as a state, it 
has literally gone from flank to front. The reality then is that Turkey is 
simultaneously both of less and of more strategic importance than it was before 
1989.42 
Kut (2001) underlines that  
On one hand, Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s inherited many issues from 
previous years: Relations with the European Union, Cyprus Conflict and Turkish-Greek 
conflicts still had primary importance for Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey’s areas of 
interest have suddenly become diversified in the post-Cold War period. 43 
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During the 1990s, Turkey, as never before during the Cold War, found itself with 
both the will and the opportunity to take an active approach beyond its borders. Despite 
failures to achieve some of its goals, in this new era Turkey’s efforts were generally 
quite successful.  
One considerable shift in Ankara’s foreign policy strategies was due to Turkey’s 
involvement in the politics of the Middle East. After Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990, 
Turkey was one of the first countries to ally with the US and to join the United Nations 
coalition against Iraq. By playing a central role in the First Gulf War, the then political 
leadership led by Turgut Özal clearly wanted to demonstrate Turkey’s continued 
allegiance to its Western allies as well as highlight the country’s strategic importance as 
the only democratic, pro-American, Islamic country in the Middle East. “The Iraq-
Kuwait crisis proved to be an important success for Turkey, especially in reaffirming 
the predominance of the geostrategic view of Turkey within policy circles in the US.”44 
The First Gulf War crisis also revealed Ankara’s new policy supporting multilateralism 
and internationally sanctioned military intervention in conflicts where Turkey was not 
directly involved. 
The close cooperation between the US and Turkey succeeded in strengthening of 
relations in the aftermath of the First Gulf War. Turkish and American policy makers 
continued sharing similar views and cooperating in a multiplicity of issues. One 
example was the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. Neither of the two countries was willing 
to take unilateral action, whereas they both called on the international community to 
help Bosnian Muslims. Another example was the relations with Moscow. Both the US 
and Turkey wanted to remain on friendly terms with Russia while making sure that 
Moscow did not expand its influence in the former Soviet republics. Accordingly, the 
US supported Turkey’s efforts to find new ways to cooperate with Russia and the 
formation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project in 1992.  
In the post-Cold War era, Ankara, quickly recognizing newly independent states 
from Central Asia to the Balkans, developed diplomatic, economic, and aid relations 
with these ex-communist states as well as participating in international efforts to solve 
conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia Herzegovina. Turkish troops served 
simultaneously in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. In 
the Balkan, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian areas, Turkey tried to influence the 
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developments using not only its geopolitical position but also its historical and cultural 
ties with the newly independent states.  
It is important to note that  
the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy after the Cold War did not derive from any 
revision of the basic principles, objectives or even priorities of Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Any new features were a result of the change in political geography and 
relationships outside Turkey. In other words, there has been no change in Turkey’s 
foreign policy line of the status quo, but a change of the status quo in the regions 
surrounding Turkey.45  
In brief, post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy can be outlined as a pragmatic 
policy that supports the international community’s consensus positions, advocates 
multilateral cooperation, and remains cautious. Turkey’s principal orientation remained 
still toward the West and Europe and an alliance with the US. However, it can be said 
that developments after the Cold War presented an environment that both enabled and 
required Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy.  
Turkish could not stabilize in the 1990s either politically, or economically. The 
political scene was dominated by fragile coalition governments, and Turkey had to deal 
with serious economic crises. Furthermore, the regime vulnerability was extremely high 
due to the continuing acts of terror of separatist Kurdish terrorist organization PKK.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
THE 57
th
 GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY 
 
 
The 57th Government of Turkey came to office following the 18 April 1999 
Elections46. According to the election results, DSP Demokratik Sol Parti [Democratic 
Left Party] gained 22.17 % of the votes and became the first party, which was followed 
by MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Movement Party] with a percentage of 
17.98 %, FP Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party] with 15.39 %, ANAP Anavatan Partisi 
[Motherland Party] with 13.22 % and DYP Doğru Yol Partisi [Right Way Party] with 
12.03 %. CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People’s Party] and HADEP 
Halkın Demokrasi Partisi [Peoples’ Democracy Party] could not enter the Parliament 
due to the 10 % threshold.  
The President Süleyman Demirel gave the duty to form the government to Bülent 
Ecevit. According to the coalition agreement of 28 May 1999, the 57th Government was 
formed as a coalition government composed of three political parties: DSP, MHP, and 
ANAP. The government received the vote of confidence in the Parliament on 9 June 
1999. Bülent Ecevit, the leader of DSP became the Prime Minister of the 57th 
Government. The other two coalition partners Devlet Bahçeli from MHP and Mesut 
Yılmaz from ANAP were the two Deputy Prime Ministers. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was mainly run by İsmail Cem and later for a short period by Şükrü Sina Gürel 
from DSP. However, concerning foreign policy issues, Mesut Yılmaz had a notable 
position, since he was responsible for Turkey- EU relations47. The 57th Government of 
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Turkey remained in office until 18 November 2002, following the 3 November 2002 
Elections.  
According to the Coalition Protocol48 and the Program of the Government49, the 
coalition partners made the following commitments concerning foreign policy:  
• Continuation of a peaceful foreign policy based on Atatürk’s principle of “peace at 
home and peace in the world” 
• Aim of foreign policy: becoming an active party in bilateral and multilateral 
international relations, while protecting Turkey’s rights, interests and sensitivities. 
• The first precondition for conducting relations with any foreign country or 
international institution: no support to the secessionist terror in Turkey. 
• Turkey’s full membership to EU is a natural right derived from history, geography, 
and agreements. Turkey’s goal to be a full member with equal rights and status to 
other members will be sought but in return, there would be no compromises of 
national rights or interests. 
• Priority areas: Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia; improvement of relations with 
Islamic countries. 
• Following an active and consistent policy with Turkic states with the aim of 
improving cooperation in economic, social, cultural and political arenas. 
• Improvement of already deep rooted and good relations with USA based on 
common and reciprocal interests. 
• Improvement of relations with Black Sea Economic Cooperation member states, 
particularly with the Russian Federation. 
• Improvement of relations with China. 
• Continuation of policies protecting and improving the already gained rights of 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
• Preconditions for improving relations with Greece:  
o Greece should stop supporting terror acts in Turkey, 
o Greece should accept dialogue for the resolution of bilateral conflicts, 
o No connection with Turkey-EU relations should be made. 
• Preconditions for initiating relations with Armenia: 
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o Armenia should stop the invasion in Azerbaijan, 
o Armenia should give up its hostile campaign against Turkey in international 
arena.     
• Active support to Bosnia and Kosovo. 
During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, developments concerning traditionally 
“sensitive” policy areas such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Greek 
relations and the relations with the European Union that were inherited from previous 
periods, continued to occupy the heavy foreign policy agenda of Turkey. The following 
gives a detailed account of related events in this period:  
Turkish-Greek Relations: Period of Rapprochement 
PKK leader Öcalan's capture in 1999 led to weakening of Turkey's relations with a 
number of countries that had protected him including Greece, on the grounds that its 
officials hid the terrorist leader at the residence of the Greek ambassador in Kenya50. 
Thus, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition inherited already tense relations with Greece. The 
two countries had been in dispute with one another concerning various issues, including 
the airspace over the Aegean and Greece's support of the PKK. The picture was further 
complicated, since Athens had been successful at using its disputes with Ankara to its 
advantage by blocking EU assistance to Turkey51.  
Under these unfavorable circumstances, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem sent a letter 
to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou in May 1999 proposing cooperation with 
Greece to jointly combat terrorism52. Cem precautiously underlined that the cooperation 
proposal he had recently extended to Greece should not be seen as an indication of a 
retreat from Ankara's position, and that any improvement in bilateral ties depended on 
Greece's termination of its support for the terrorist PKK organization53. Greek Foreign 
Minister Papandreou accepted Cem’s offer by saying that Greece was willing to talk to 
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Turkey about combating terrorism but was not yet ready to sign an agreement on the 
issue54.  
Meanwhile, Greece continued to block any large EU steps towards Turkey at the 
3-4 June 1999 Cologne European Council, so that  the then 15-member bloc appealed to 
Turkey to continue with economic and political reforms until the Union took up 
Turkey's case in six months at the Helsinki Summit. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
criticized the EU for using Greece as an excuse to block Turkey’s entrance into the 
Union55. 
Greece and Turkey agreed to hold talks to discuss issues such as terrorism, 
tourism and trade in an incremental effort to improve relations56, which could be 
interpreted as a cautious step toward better relations while avoiding for that time being 
contentious topics such as Cyprus57. The first leg of the long-anticipated talks between 
Turkey and Greece ended in a positive atmosphere in Ankara in August 199958. 
However, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou received intense criticism at home from 
opposition parties and Greek media.59. 
The skeptics about Turkish- Greek rapprochement in both countries gave in after a 
killer quake in Turkey that was followed shortly by another one in Athens. On 17 
August 1999, an earthquake with the strength of 7.4 of the Richter scale hit Turkey's 
northwestern industrial heartland early in the morning, causing massive damage and 
record deaths. In a show of support towards its neighbor, Greece was the first country 
that ordered its emergency services to help Turkey deal with the devastating 
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earthquake60. This traumatic event marked a turning point in both countries’ public 
opinion towards each other. Turkey's ambassador publicly thanked Greece for rushing 
aid to Turkish earthquake victims, saying he had been overwhelmed by offers of help61. 
Starting from August, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou hinted that the 
recently accelerated rapprochement between Turkey and Greece might result in the 
lifting of the longstanding Greek veto on EU funds for Turkey62. In September 1999, 
praising the growing atmosphere of solidarity between Turkey and Greece, Foreign 
Minister İsmail Cem stressed that the generous human response should stimulate 
‘political acts’ of the same proportions by both sides63. The same month, Greece 
declared that it would not create any problems with the EU providing financial aid for 
Turkey to overcome the devastation caused by the earthquake64.  
At a weekend meeting of EU foreign ministers, Greek Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou gave signals of a potential change in Greek foreign policy declaring that his 
country was ready to let Turkey into the 15-nation union. Papandreou was quoted that 
the killer earthquake that hit Turkey ‘created new climate ’, and that ‘human warmth 
came out of this tragedy. A message came out ... that we must work for peace’65. 
Still in a process of coping with the disastrous impact of the 17 August 
earthquake, Turkey took immediate action to assist in the search and rescue efforts 
following a quake that shook Athens. Turkish search and rescue team AKUT was sent 
to Athens for participating in rescue activities66.  
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Following these sad experiences in both countries, Greece and Turkey decided to 
form a joint emergency response team to deal with natural disasters67. The UN General 
Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution that noted with satisfaction the decision 
by Greece and Turkey to establish a joint, standby disaster response unit68. 
Despite the warm atmosphere, critical issues between Turkey and Greece 
remained untouched. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, addressing Turkish 
academicians and journalists during his İstanbul visit in October 1999, underlined that 
Greeks were highly suspicious of Turkey's intentions in the Aegean Sea and of its 
policies over Cyprus69. The same month, Turkish concerns about the upcoming Helsinki 
Summit revealed, as Prime Minister Ecevit expressed his hope that Greece would lift its 
veto on Turkey's entry into the EU70. 
The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey promised to work toward friendship 
but continued not to mention key disputes or challenges that lie ahead. “The 
[confidence-building] process is moving along positively and much more quickly than 
expected... Already the tensions we used to encounter constantly have begun to 
dissipate”, Foreign Minister Cem told reporters after meeting his Greek counterpart 
Papandreou in Greece71. 
Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou declared that there could be no final 
rapprochement with Turkey until there was a settlement regarding Cyprus…and that 
Cyprus remained the main obstacle to achieving closer relations72, whereas Turkish 
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President Süleyman Demirel warned Greece that the recently improved relations could 
deteriorate again, if Greece objected to Turkey's bid for the European Union73. 
At the 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki European Council, Greece did not object to 
Turkey’s candidacy and Turkey was finally granted candidate status by the EU. 
However, the EU offer explicitly called on Turkey to resolve its long-standing disputes 
with neighboring Greece before full membership negotiations could be launched74. 
Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis welcomed Turkey's EU candidacy conveying 
his hope that it would help resolve many of its chronic disputes with Greece, but added 
that the road to lasting peace ‘would be long and difficult’75. Prime Minister Ecevit 
replied that the EU candidate Turkey would do its utmost to solve its territorial disputes 
with Greece before the 2004 deadline for a negotiated solution set by the EU76.  
In January 2000, Papandreou repeated that Greece continued to support a 
settlement on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, envisaging reunification 
through the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a single 
international identity77. 
Besides Cyprus issue, arming and military remained thorny issues between Turkey 
and Greece despite the rapprochement. Greek military officials declared that Greece 
would not slow its costly military build-up despite the recent thaw in relations with 
longtime rival Turkey. Similarly, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) declared discomfort 
about the current situation and complained about Greece's reluctance to launch a 
dialogue on basic military and security issues. The Turkish military was under the 
impression that Greece has not shown any sign of goodwill towards the resolution of 
disputes, and was instead increasingly arming itself78.  
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Another problematic issue between the two rivals concerned the Halki Orthodox 
Theological School.  Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, on a landmark visit to 
Turkey, met Patriarch Bartholomew I and pressed for the reopening of Halki School 
closed by the Turkish authorities nearly 30 years ago79.  
In February 2000, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem visited Greece and signed 
five cooperation deals with his counterpart80. Thus, putting aside their main differences, 
the two countries, which were looking for areas of cooperation, signed a total of nine 
uncontroversial agreements encompassing cooperation on culture, maritime trade, 
customs administrations, science and technology, economic and technical studies, 
cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime, tourism, the environment and 
the promotion and protection of investments81.  
The contacts also continued at prime ministerial level. The Turkish and Greek 
Prime Ministers met and vowed to keep on improving their ‘very positive’ ties, and 
Simitis reiterated his support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union82.  
Business leaders from both countries met in Athens and declared banking, 
shipping and tourism would be among the most promising possible joint ventures 
between Greece and Turkey in the current climate of détente83.  
Greek diplomats arrived in Turkey to help coach their Turkish counterparts on 
how to prepare for EU membership84.  
                                                 
79 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.1.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_30_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
80 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 13.2.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_13_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM  
81 Turkish Daily News. Will Cem and Papandreou Be Able to Begin Discussing Thorny 
Issues? 13.2.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_13_00&d=probe&fn=FOR
EIGN.HTM 
82 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.2.2000 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_20_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
83 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.2.2000.  
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_27_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
84 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.3.2000 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_05_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
 42 
Although Greece announced to participate for the first time in a multinational 
military exercise organized by Turkey85, the concerns over Cyprus issue clouded this 
attempt and Greece pulled out of the military exercise in March 2000 after realizing the 
maneuvers could be held over northern Cyprus86.  
The reelection of Simitis Government in Greece was kindly welcomed by Turkey 
and raised hopes that Greece would continue a policy of rapprochement with traditional 
rival Turkey87.Turkish government closely watched the new Greek government’s 
cabinet composition with regard to possible effects on improved Turkish-Greek 
relations88. 
In May 2000, Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou were given ‘Statesman of 
the Year’ awards by the US East-West Institute89. 
On 19 May 2000, Turkish warplanes made a historic landing on Greek soil to join 
NATO exercises, displaying the remarkable improvement in relations between the 
longtime regional rivals90. However, the Turkish General Staff, clarifying news and 
comments in the Turkish media that Turkey might agree to dismantle its Aegean army 
as a goodwill gesture to Greece, issued a written statement denying that it was prepared 
to abolish that army91. 
While Greek Premier Simitis said further improvements in relations between 
Greece and Turkey would depend on finding a peaceful solution to the division of 
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Cyprus since 197492, the Greek government continued with its good will gestures such 
as the lifting of visa requirement for Turks who want to visit Greek islands for one-day 
trips93. 
Despite considerable improvement in relations, in August 2000, Greek 
government spokesman Dimitris Reppas accused Turkey of being ‘stuck in the past’ 
and lacking in democracy, as he commented after Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem 
claimed the rights of the Muslim minority in Northern Thrace were not being 
respected94. However, Greece also declared its will to retain a climate of good relations 
with traditional rival Turkey95. The next month, Kostas Simitis underlined that Turkey 
faced a long road to joining mainstream Europe and needed constant reminders of what 
is required to meet that goal96. 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit hinted at Turkey’s irritation with the slow pace of 
progress in ties with Greece and said that the time had come to discuss fundamental 
territorial disputes97.  
Furthermore, Turkish military underlined the fact that although efforts have been 
made to decrease tensions between traditional rivals Greece and Turkey, more work 
needed to be done98. 
In a further sign of warming ties, Turkey and Greece submitted a joint bid to host 
the 2008 European Soccer Championship99, and a Turco-Greek media conference was 
held in Istanbul100. 
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Although the defense ministers of Greece and Turkey declared that there was a 
common interest from both sides to realize that the cost of armaments is a truly great 
burden on both nations, Turkey and Greece continued to have problems in the context 
of joint NATO exercises101. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed to 
resolve bilateral differences within the NATO and in bilateral talks by announcing 
agreement on confidence-building measures in November 2000 in Budapest. Moreover, 
Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, paying the highest-level visit from Turkey to 
Greece in 12 years on 3 November 2000, once again called on Athens to discuss 
methods to solve disputes between the two countries102. Greece pledged to help 
traditional rival Turkey work towards membership of the EU. In this friendly 
atmosphere, Turkey and Greece began discussing a set of measures designed to prevent 
potential conflicts over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea103. 
“Let's make the probability of war zero, let's cut defense spending”, Sabah 
newspaper quoted Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou as telling a group of 
Turkish journalists in Athens104.  
However, despite all these efforts, Cyprus conflict remained at the core as the 
thorniest issue on Turkish and Greek agendas. Greece continued with its position 
claiming that Turkey was responsible for the lack of settlement of the dispute and added 
that this situation would not help Turkey on its way to EU membership105. 
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In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, a significant improvement in 
Turkish-Greek relations is observed, which basically concerned low politics issues. The 
policies on controversial issues like the Aegean and Cyprus remained unresolved and 
continued to be an obstacle.   
Relations with the EU: Candidacy 
Ankara froze its political ties with the EU after that body decided to exclude 
Turkey from the list of candidates eligible for full membership in 12-13 December 1997 
Luxembourg European Council. However, if the EU displayed a more positive approach 
towards Ankara in the upcoming summit in Cologne, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition 
was likely to resume the suspended dialogue106.  
To Turkish leaders’ disappointment, the 3-4 June 1999 Cologne European Council 
decisions107 did not include any reference as regards to Turkey, leaving the issue of 
Turkish candidacy to the Helsinki Summit at the end of the year. German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder expressed regret that Germany could not manage to secure any 
rapprochement between Turkey and the European Union during its presidency, which 
ended at the Cologne Summit. Schroeder said that they aimed at outlining an explicit 
calendar for advancing the Turkey-EU rapprochement but failed to do that due to the 
objections of ‘a few Union members’108, indirectly referring to Greek veto.  
In the period from Cologne to Helsinki Summit, Turkish foreign policy issues 
were highly intertwined, such as the connection between Turkey’s relations with the EU 
concerning its human rights issues, particularly with respect to the Öcalan case and the 
Kurdish minority, and with Turkish- Greek relations. As discussed before in more 
detail, Turkish- Greek rapprochement starting with the earthquake led to a considerable 
improvement in bilateral relations and a lift of Greek objection to Turkish candidacy. 
The developments concerning the Öcalan case and the Kurdish minority are discussed 
in more detail under the analytical dimension of B 2 Regime Vulnerability. 
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10-11 December 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions, marking a historical 
change in Turkey- EU relations, finally granted candidate status to Turkey and included 
the following on Turkey’s candidacy: 
The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted 
in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms 
towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria.  
Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States.  
Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, 
will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. 
This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing 
towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the 
issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). 
Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes 
and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the 
context of the accession process.  
An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European 
Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations 
must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the 
obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the 
adoption of the acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. 
With a view to intensifying the harmonization of Turkey's legislation and practice 
with the acquis, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical 
examination of the acquis.  
The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for 
coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-
accession109. 
 
Prime Minister Ecevit pledged rapid human rights and democratic reform to meet 
criteria set by the EU for eventual entry talks110. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem met EU 
officials in Brussels and said that Turkey could make quick progress towards EU 
membership terms following the Helsinki decision underlining that the granted 
candidate status would help to make necessary political and institutional reforms111. The 
clear political will of Turkey was also appreciated by the EU officials. However, soon 
after Helsinki, human rights issues started to create tensions between Turkey and the 
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EU112. Predominantly, the problems regarding the Kurdish minority led to severe 
polarizations such as the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen’s use of the 
phrase the “Kurdish problem”, which was interpreted by Ecevit as ‘racism’ for blaming 
Turkey’s 15-year campaign against Kurdish separatist terrorists on ethnic division113.  
In April 2000, the EU conveyed Turkey its disappointment of the slow pace of 
human rights reforms since the country had achieved candidacy for EU membership in 
December114. Moreover, Ankara's failure to abolish the death penalty remained an 
obstacle to better relations as it sought membership in the EU115.  
In July 2000, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit appointed his coalition partner Mesut 
Yılmaz as Deputy Prime Minister for Relations with the European Union, and declared 
that Turkey would fulfill conditions for EU membership ‘earlier than anticipated’116. 
Soon afterwards, a European Union Secretariat was formed under Prime Ministry117 
In August 2000, after holding out for 34 years, Turkey signed the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, in a step towards joining the European Union118. 
Turkey’s main concern was that the Accession Partnership Accord would not 
include references to Turkish-Greek and Cyprus disputes, which was being prepared by 
                                                 
112 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.2.2000.  
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_27_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
113 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.3.2000  . 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_26_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
114 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.4.2000 . 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_16_00&d=probe&fn=DO
M2.HTM 
115 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 11.6.2000 . 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_11_00&d=probe&fn=dom
2.htm 
116 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.7.2000 . 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_16_00&d=probe&fn=dom
2.htm 
117 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.8.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_27_00&d=probe&fn=dom
2.htm 
118 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.8.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_20_00&d=probe&fn=dom
2.htm 
 48 
the European Union119. Finally on 8 November 2000, the European Commission made 
public the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey120. The document set short and 
medium-term goals for Turkey including democratic, economic, judicial, and social 
reforms. The Accession  Partnership Document also referred to the Cyprus dispute in its 
short-term measures. Turkey accepted an EU road map to membership, despite the 
reservations over Cyprus demands, and confirmed that it would do everything necessary 
to meet requirements for sweeping democratic and economic reforms121. Now it was 
Turkey's turn to prepare the National Accession Program, which would delineate the 
road map to be followed by this country”122.  
Prime Minister Ecevit asked the Prime Ministries of the EU in a letter to remove 
the Cyprus segment mentioned in the short-term measures of the Accession Partnership 
Document123. Moreover, he issued a harsh warning to the EU, stating that Turkey would 
not be fooled by ‘nonsense’ on Kurdish minority rights and that the EU had ‘duped’ 
Ankara with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean. Also Foreign Minister İsmail Cem 
claimed that the EU made a big mistake in the Accession Partnership Document by 
referring to the Cyprus issue in the document's short-term priorities section124. 
The direct reference to Cyprus in the short term measures was changed to the 
following:  
4.1 Short term  
Enhanced political dialogue and political criteria  
In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political 
dialogue, strongly support the U.N. Secretary General's efforts to bring to a 
successful conclusion process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.  
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4.2 Medium term  
Enhanced political dialogue and political criteria  
In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political 
dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with 
the U.N. Charter, make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and 
other related issues, as referred in point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions.125 
  
Preparation of the National Programme proved to be more difficult than expected. 
Amidst escalating tensions among coalition partners and the General Staff, Ankara 
announced that Turkey's priorities would be pivotal in the preparation of the National 
Program. Coalition leaders who met to discuss the details of the National Program 
apparently could not reach a compromise and postponed their final decision.  
As a parallel development, Turkey refused to change its policy over the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) despite intensified pressure coming from the EU 
and the United States, stating that Turkey would not approve ESDP access to NATO 
unless Turkey was also included in the decision-making process126.  
The economic crisis in Turkey that resulted from a political crisis emerged at a 
time when were intensified relations between Turkey and the European Union. This 
situation raised concerns whether the latest negative developments would damage 
Turkey's bid for EU membership. While EU circles in Ankara tend to downplay the 
significance of the crisis, analysts have voiced concerns that Turkey's position was 
getting weaker in the EU on the eve of the presentation of the National Program127. 
Finally by the end of February 2001, coalition leaders and top military officers 
were able to reach a compromise regarding with the National Program at National 
Security Council (MGK) meeting128, which was approved by the Cabinet on 19 
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March129. Turkey declared its National Program of Action for the eventual membership 
in European Union in a bid to express its readiness to launch far-reaching reforms130. 
In August 2002, Turkey's Parliament voted in favor of abolishing the death 
penalty in peacetime, and following a landmark two-day marathon session, the 
Parliament adopted a major reform package aimed at preparing the country for 
European Union membership131. 
In sum, relations with the European Union continued at good speed during the 
DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. However, Turkish foreign policy actors remained 
suspicious, divided and cautious on EU’s demands on cultural rights and the role of the 
military in politics. 
Cyprus Conflict 
Concerning the resolution of the conflict, Turkey’s and Turkish Cypriots followed 
a status quo approach during DSP-MHP-ANAP government.  
Prime Minister Ecevit, rejecting a call from G8 countries for the resumption of 
UN sponsored talks between the two communities, stated that “there has been peace in 
Cyprus since the Turkish peace operation”132. The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement saying the acknowledgement of the existence of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (KKTC) is the only way that can lead to the resumption of bilateral 
talks in long-divided Cyprus133. This positional attitude was framed as making no 
concessions on the Cyprus problem134. There was a great deal of harmony between the 
Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who persistently said 
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“No solution will be found in Cyprus without accepting the reality that there are two 
separate states on the island and without looking at those two states as equals”135. 
Attending the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus 
in July 1999, Ecevit warned in Nicosia that if the solution on the island was not based 
on a two-state confederation, an ‘enhanced’ integration between Turkey and the KKTC 
would be the alternative136.  
Meanwhile, United States was also encouraging parties to find a just and lasting 
solution to the dispute. Thomas G. Weston is named special coordinator137. Cyprus 
problem was declared to be ‘one of President Clinton's major foreign policy 
priorities’138. 
In August 1999, Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş attended UN-sponsored 
proximity talks in New York139, which ended without success. Starting from 3 
December 1999, a new round of proximity talks was held140 . 
Concerning the Helsinki European Council decisions, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Denktaş commented that the EU decision was a ‘Greek blackmail’ and would only 
serve to solidify the division on the island141, whereas he welcomed Turkish candidacy 
saying that it could help Europe better understand the problems of the divided island of 
Cyprus142. 
Another round of proximity talks in Geneva again ended with no concrete 
results143. The UN Security Council urged Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to 
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continue talks on reunifying the Mediterranean island and expressed hope that progress 
on substantive issues could soon be made144. 
With the assignment of the new UN envoy Alvaro de Soto, Cyprus traffic gained 
pace again. Conditions, de Soto told145, for ending the unofficial partition of Cyprus 
were more favorable than ever, adding his hopes that improving relations between 
traditional rivals Greece and Turkey could provide the necessary impetus to help solve 
the 26-year division of the island146.  
In March 2000, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen repeated EU’s 
invitation for Turkish Cypriots to participate in the accession talks, but Denktaş once 
again refused the offer saying that Turkish Cypriots were willing to open separate talks 
with the EU, but would never accept joining the Greek Cypriot delegation.147  
The Turkish government was fully supporting Denktaş for his re-election as 
President. Furthermore, the International Atatürk Peace Award of 2000 was given to 
Denktaş. On 24 April, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas is sworn in for his fourth 
term as President. 148 
A new round of proximity talks were scheduled to resume on 5 July in Geneva.149 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with the help of American and British envoys was 
drafting a new ‘set of ideas’, which would officially be conveyed to the two sides 
during the proximity talks, and if the two sides agreed on the package, the two Cypriot 
leaders would ‘fill in the gaps’ in the subsequent face-to-face stage150. However, the 
third round of U.N.-brokered indirect peace talks aimed at reuniting Cyprus's Greek and 
Turkish communities broke off for consultations after a week of secret shuttle 
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diplomacy in Geneva151. The next round of U.N.-brokered indirect Cyprus peace talks 
was scheduled due Sept. 12 in New York152. However, Denktaş ruled out the possibility 
of a direct meeting between himself and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Glafcos Clerides 
until he declared that he is not the president of the entire island153.  
Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for negotiations between the leaders of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots in which each party “represented its side -and no one else- 
as the political equal of the other” at the start of the fourth round of the proximity 
talks154. Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas conferred with U.N. officials, while 
Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides awaited clarification by U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan before deciding whether of not to return to talks on Cyprus155. 
After a two-day boycott, Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides returned to the 
table156. Turkey, in solid support of Turkish Cypriots, urged the United Nations to 
accept the existence of two separate states on Cyprus as a means to end the island's 
decades-old division157. Denktaş toughened his stance by saying that talks to reunite the 
divided island could be drawn out indefinitely unless his state’s authority in northern 
Cyprus is acknowledged by Greek Cypriot rivals158. Under these circumstances, the 
fourth round of the Cyprus proximity talks concluded in New York, without much 
progress. New round of proximity talks were scheduled to resume in Geneva in 
November159, which again ended without visible progress and with a renewed warning 
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that the process will be ‘long and drawn-out’, whereas Turkey underlined U.N. 
proposals at the Cyprus talks marked a step backwards in pursuit of a settlement on the 
divided island, and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas added that he might shun a 
further round160.  
Turkey’s position was crystallized after the Cyprus summit held at the Presidential 
Palace that unless the existence of the KKTC was acknowledged and the equality of the 
two sides on the island was established, continuation of the proximity talks process 
would only be a ‘waste of time’. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit supported the pulling out 
of Turkish Cypriots from the U.N.-sponsored peace talks161, while Alvaro de Soto, the 
U.N. special envoy for Cyprus, reportedly asked Turkish officials to convince Denktaş 
to take part in the sixth round of proximity talks to be held at the end of January 
2001162. Similarly, the United States urged Denktaş to take part in next round of U.N.-
sponsored peace talks163. However, Denktaş was not convinced164 saying that he would 
not attend more U.N.-mediated talks over Cyprus unless he received the international 
recognition accorded to rival Glafcos Clerides165.  
Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) signed a protocol 
envisaging enhanced economic and financial cooperation between the two countries and 
finalizing the plans to transfer a credit to the KKTC166. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, 
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declared that if Greek Cypriots became EU member, there would be no other option for 
the KKTC but to integrate with Turkey167. 
By the end of July 2001, Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas finally agreed to 
meet U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York168 and in December 2001, 
Denktaş was convinced to return to the negotiating table. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
welcomed the resumption of talks on Cyprus, which he said might ‘open a few 
doors’.169  
A solution to the Cyprus problem should be seen as “a win-win situation”, Greek 
Foreign Minister George Papandreou told the U.N. General Assembly, calling on 
Turkey to show the necessary political will to make such a settlement possible170. 
In October 2002, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan began two days of talks 
with the leaders of Cyprus in hopes of progress toward a last-minute deal to reunite the 
island before the EU decided to invite the Greek Cypriots to join the bloc. However, this 
last attempt was not fully exhausted either, since Denktas had a heart surgery in New 
York171. 
In sum, despite the pressure and efforts of international community to find a 
solution to the conflict before the [Greek] Cypriot entry to the EU, Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots continued to follow a positional attitude and walked away from the 
negotiations. 
Armenian Issue 
In June 1999, Turkey reacted strongly to the opening of a monument 
commemorating the so-called Armenian genocide in a small French city. “It is obvious 
that the opening of the monument aims at fanning hostility against Turkey and the 
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Turks and harming relations between Turkey and France”, a Foreign Ministry statement 
declared172.  
Another example was concerning a statement by the Israeli Education Minister 
Sarid that the so-called Armenian genocide accounts should be included in high school 
textbooks173. As a retaliatory move, Turkish government instructed the Cabinet not to 
participate in Israel's national day reception174. This small crisis could be overcome after 
the Israeli Foreign Minister Levy sent a letter to Foreign Minister Cem clarifying that 
Israel maintained its position that the issue should be left for historians175. 
A bigger crisis occurred when the U.S. House International Relations Committee's 
Subcommittee on Human Rights passed a resolution calling on President Clinton to 
officially label the alleged killings of approximately 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman 
Turks from 1915 to 1923 a genocide. From the Prime Minister to Turkey's Armenian 
Patriarch, Turks expressed anger and disappointment176. Although the Clinton 
administration dissociated itself from a congressional resolution recognizing the 
accusations, a crowd of sympathizers to the far-right MHP protested outside the U.S. 
Embassy. Turkey's Chief of General Staff Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu declared that the United 
States should study its own past. Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) joined the 
debate by stating that the claims brought to the U.S. House of Representatives' agenda 
by fanatical Armenians regarding the so-called genocide were viewed by the MGK with 
great regret177. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer telephoned President Bill Clinton to 
express concern about the pro-Armenian resolution in Congress. Ignoring Turkish 
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condemnation and warnings from the Clinton administration that relations with Ankara 
could be damaged, the U.S. House of Representatives committee approved the 
resolution. Chief of General Staff Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu canceled a trip to the States in 
protest. Moreover, Turkey warned the United States that its jets could lose the use of the 
Turkey's Incirlik air base to patrol Northern Iraq178.  
This crisis could be overcome only after the U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed 
his ‘deep concern’ and potential ‘far-reaching negative consequences’ for the United 
States, so that the decision was withdrawn. Prime Minister Ecevit sent a letter to Clinton 
in order to thank him for his efforts to make a resolution possible179. 
By the end of 2000, the Armenian allegations caused renewed problems with 
France. Turkey warned France that relations between the two countries will be damaged 
if its Parliament passed a bill accusing Ottoman Turks of a massacre of Armenians in 
1915180. Turkey reacted strongly to a resolution passed by the French Senate 
recognizing a so-called Armenian genocide181. Turkish Defense Ministry cancelled a 
$149 million deal with a French firm to launch a spy satellite in retaliation to the 
genocide allegations182. 
In sum, DSP-MHP-ANAP Government followed a strict and reactionary status 
quo policy, by resorting to threats and retaliations to those who would sympathize with 
these allegations concerning the Armenian genocide allegations.  
 
 
In this chapter, foreign policy of the 57th Government of Turkey will be described 
and analyzed according to the dimensions drawn in Chapter I. 
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A: International Factors 
 
 
A.1. Change in Systemic Conditions 
 
DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition era witnessed two post- Cold War American 
presidents with markedly different world views. The first one was Bill Clinton, the 42nd 
US President who has been in office for two terms starting from 1993 and continuing 
until 2001, when he handed over the US Presidency to George W. Bush, the 43rd US 
President, who is currently serving his second term as well. 
Clinton's initiatives in foreign policy during his first term included a successful 
effort in September–October 1994 to reinstate Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, who had been ousted by a military coup in 1991; the sponsorship of 
peace talks and the eventual Dayton Accords (1995) aimed at ending the ethnic 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and a leading role in the ongoing attempt to 
bring about a permanent resolution of the dispute between Palestinians and 
Israelis.183 
 
Clinton’s success was not limited to foreign policy initiatives. “Clinton was 
handily reelected in 1996, buoyed by a recovering and increasingly strong economy. 
Strong economic growth continued during Clinton's second term, eventually setting a 
record for the country's longest peacetime expansion”184.  
Clinton’s successful presidency term was unexpectedly shadowed over a private 
life issue.  “In 1998, he became…the second US president to be impeached”185.  
After conclusive evidence of his affair [with Monica Lewinsky, a White House 
intern] came to light, Clinton apologized to his family and to the American 
public...The House of Representatives in 1998 approved two articles of 
impeachment, for perjury and obstruction of justice. Clinton was acquitted of the 
charges by the Senate in 1999. Despite his impeachment, Clinton's job-approval 
rating remained high.186  
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“Still, while suffering so many headaches at home, Clinton and his administration 
successfully continued in their role as Washington's global peacemaker”187.  
In foreign affairs, Clinton ordered a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq in 
December 1998 in response to Iraq's failure to cooperate fully with United Nations 
weapons inspectors (the bombing coincided with the start of full congressional 
debate on Clinton's impeachment).  
In 1999 U.S.-led forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
conducted a successful three-month bombing campaign against Yugoslavia 
designed to end Serbian attacks on ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo.  
In 1998 and 2000 Clinton was hailed as a peacemaker in visits to Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, and in 2000 he became the first U.S. president to visit Vietnam 
since the end of the Vietnam War.  
He spent the last weeks of his presidency in an unsuccessful effort to broker a 
final peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.188 
 
While US foreign policy during Clinton’s Presidency can be characterized with 
rather multilateralist and conflict resolution oriented foreign policy behavior189, i.e. 
acting more cooperative and flexible for the resolution of bilateral and international 
conflicts190, in 2001 the Presidency was handed over to the Republican George W. Bush 
with a different set of foreign policy preferences from his predecessor.  
Narrowly winning the Electoral College vote over Vice President Al Gore in one 
of the closest and most controversial elections in American history, George W. 
Bush became the first person since Benjamin Harrison in 1888 to become 
president despite having lost the nationwide popular vote. He was narrowly 
reelected in 2004, defeating Democratic challenger John Kerry.191  
 
Bush’s and his team’s world view prefers unilateralism over multilateralism. 
Although US’ unilateralist approach became even more obvious after Sept. 11th 
atrocities, this approach based on a unipolar system that does not exclude the use of a 
military force, has been evident from the beginning of Bush’s first term.  
                                                 
187 Turkish Daily News. Man of the Year: Bill Clinton. 1.1.2000. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_01_00&fn=FOR.HTM 
188 ibid. 
189 For more information on Clinton’s Foreign Policy see Rubinstein A. Z. Shayevic A. 
Zlotnikov B. (eds.). 2000. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader. New Yok: M.E. Sharpe. 
Chapter 1-5. 
190 For analytical evidence see Walker S. G., Schafer M., Young M. D. (eds.). 
Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the post–Cold War 
World in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43 No. 5, October 1999. Sage 
Publications. pp. 610-625.  
191 Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Bush, George W. 
http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=9126475 
 60 
In foreign affairs, the Bush administration announced that the United States would 
not abide by the Kyoto Protocol on reducing the emission of gases responsible for 
global warming (the United States had signed the protocol in the last days of the 
Bill Clinton administration) because the agreement did not impose emission limits 
on developing countries and because it could harm the U.S. economy. The 
administration also withdrew from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems and attempted to secure commitments from various 
governments not to extradite U.S. citizens to the new International Criminal Court, 
whose jurisdiction it rejected. To many of Bush's critics at home and abroad, these 
developments reflected a dangerous unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy.192  
 
Systemic conditions changed abruptly, as on 11 September 2001 four American 
commercial airplanes were hijacked by al-Qaeda terrorists and were deliberately 
crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and destroyed 
part of the Pentagon building outside Washington DC. “The crashes—the worst terrorist 
incident on U.S. soil—killed some 3,000 people and prompted calls around the world 
for a global war on terrorism”193.  
Bush toughened his rhetoric and charged the Taliban government of Afghanistan 
with harboring the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. US administration managed to 
build an international coalition against terrorism with UN and NATO support. Massive 
bombing campaign on Afghanistan that started as early as October 2001, forced the 
Taliban from power. Bush worked with various ethnic and political factions in 
Afghanistan to establish a stable regime there that would run compatible to American 
interests.  
In sum, a remarkable change in systemic conditions occurred from multilateralism 
towards unilateralism due to the handover of the American Presidency and the terrorist 
attack on 11 September 2001. However, no direct impact is detected on foreign policy 
change in Turkey during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition concerning the sensitive issue 
areas such as the Cyprus conflict, the Turkey-EU relations, Turkish Greek relations and 
the Armenian issue. 
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A.2. Regional Developments 
 
Two important regional developments during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition 
were the war in Kosovo, and EU enlargement. 
 A2. Kosovo 
Since mid March 1999, Yugoslavia had been the scene of severe bombardment by 
NATO, aimed at stopping the systematic ethnic cleansing being carried out against 
Kosovo's Albanian population194. The Kosovo issue and the bombardment of 
Yugoslavia appeared to be the most immediate and inevitable foreign policy issue 
Turkey had to deal with right after the 18 April 1999 election campaigns.  
Turkey’s involvement in the conflict had multiple aspects: Militarily, Turkey has 
participated in the NATO air strikes with air force jets flying combat air patrol (CAP) 
missions to protect the bombers195. Turkish forces were deployed in southern Kosovo, 
an area where ethnic Turks are concentrated, as part of the NATO peacekeeping force 
known as KFOR196. From humanitarian aspect, Turkey furthermore agreed to admit ten 
thousands of Kosovar refugees into its borders, who have left their war-torn province in 
order to seek safety in Turkey and found shelter there after fleeing Serbian violence197. 
In addition, based on its cultural and historical links with the region, Turkey provided 
substantial humanitarian assistance to the region on its own initiative.  
Once the security was reestablished in Kosovo, Kosovar refugees in Turkey 
returned to their country starting from June 1999198. According to the Turkish Interior 
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Ministry, the number of refugees returning from Turkey to Kosovo reached 15.000 by 
mid July199. 
In sum, the operation in Kosovo was a joint effort based on UN Resolutions under 
NATO umbrella, which Turkey fully supported. However, this development itself had 
no impact on foreign policy change in Turkey in the traditionally sensitive issues. 
A2. EU Enlargement 
The EU has a history of successful enlargements. The Treaties of Paris in 1951, 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and Rome in 1957, 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM, were signed 
by six founding members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. The EU then underwent four successive enlargements with Denmark, 
Ireland and UK in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in 1995. 
In March 1998 the EU formally launched the process that would make a new 
enlargement possible. With the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Enlargement is one of the most important opportunities for the European Union at 
the beginning of the 21st century. It is a unique, historic task to further the 
integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of stability and 
prosperity to new members.200 
 
At its summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, the European Council decided 
that the enlargement process should encompass 
…the European Conference, a multilateral framework bringing together ten 
central European countries, Cyprus and Turkey, which was launched on 12 March 
1998;  
the accession process, covering ten central European countries and Cyprus, which 
was launched on 30 March 1998;  
the accession negotiations, which the European Council decided to open on 31 
March 1998 with six countries, as recommended by the European Commission: 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.201  
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Cyprus conflict was highly intertwined with Turkey-EU relations. The conflict on 
the island had already become part and parcel of the EU enlargement agenda due to the 
membership applications of Turkey in 1987 and of Cyprus in 1990. Concerning the 
feasibility of the Cypriot membership, the EC suggested that the question of the division 
of the island was to be resolved first: “…The Community considers Cyprus as eligible 
for membership as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer…”202 However, EU 
made a u-turn in Corfu and Essen European Councils in 1994 stating that Cyprus would 
be included in the next enlargement. Essen Summit in December 1994 called for a 
settlement of the Cyprus problem that would bring territorial unity and integrity of the 
country in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, while deciding at the same time 
that the next enlargement of the EU will contain Cyprus203. The final blow for Turkey 
and Turkish Cypriots came when in December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, a 
date was given to Cyprus to begin the accession negotiations with the EU, whereas 
Turkey was denied the status of a candidate country204.  
Although the Helsinki European Council granted candidate status to Turkey, at the 
same time it stated that: “ If no settlement has been reached by the completion of 
accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the 
above being a precondition…”205 Ankara was promoting a policy under which Turkey 
and Cyprus could become members of the European Union simultaneously, but as two 
sovereign states, whereas countries such as Britain sought the full membership of 
Cyprus first206.  
At this stage of EU enlargement,  
While the Republic of Cyprus had been making rapid progress in the accession 
negotiations, the conflict-settlement efforts were not moving forward. The 
European Union responded negatively to Turkish-Cypriot demands and requests, 
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such as recognition by the international community and the removal of the trade 
embargo on the TRNC. The European Union promised to respond with incentives, 
including a small amount of annual financial aid, in return for a settlement that 
was favorable to the European Union’s enlargement project. In the UN-sponsored 
process, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash twice walked away from the 
negotiations. On November 2001, Turkey threatened to annex the TRNC if the 
RoC joined the member states of the EU.207 
 
In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, EU’s enlargement process was 
continuing at good speed, whereby Turkey was one of the candidates. This regional 
development had different types of impacts on the change of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
While it was a catalyst factor and thus had a positive impact concerning Turkish-Greek 
relations and relations of Turkey with the EU as discussed earlier, it had no impact on 
the Armenian issue. Moreover, it had a negative impact concerning the Cyprus conflict, 
which led to a toughening of Turkish foreign policy in this issue. 
 
A.3. Foreign Commitments 
 
Major foreign commitments during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition covered a 
wide range of issues: Militarily, Turkey engaged in commitments in the context of 
NATO operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF). A significant 
development was that starting from August 2002, Turkey assumed the lead of the 
second ISAF mission after Britain208.  
Economically, the coalition government signed final agreements pertaining to the 
Bakü-Ceyhan project, which aimed at the transfer of Azerbaijani petroleum to Western 
markets through a pipeline passing through Turkish territory. The other party countries 
were Azerbaijan and Georgia. The agreements, namely the Full Handover Agreement, 
the Transit Country Agreement, the Guarantee Documents Agreement and the Host 
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Country Agreement, are being seen as a major step in the implementation of the 
project209. 
Politically, the major new commitment during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition can be 
considered as the National Program with the EU, whereby Turkey declared its political 
and economic targets in line with the Accession Partnership Document, and committed 
itself to fulfill these in a given schedule with the ultimate aim for joining the EU. 
In sum, Turkey’s major commitment was towards the EU, which had no impact on 
foreign policy change in the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, but a positive one 
concerning Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations. 
 
 
B: Domestic Factors 
 
 
B.1. Domestic Regime Change 
 
As stated before, 57th Government of Turkey came to office following the 18 April 
1999 Elections, whereby DSP gained 22.17 % of the votes, MHP 17.98 % and junior 
coalition partner ANAP 13.22 %. The surprise coalition partner of the 57th Government 
was the far right nationalist MHP.  
Neither the experts conducting opinion polls nor the politicians had predicted that 
the MHP…would finish second. That came as a big surprise. Those who are wary 
of the nationalist views of the MHP, which has won 130 parliamentary seats, are 
not prepared to accept the argument that the MHP may have changed… 
The suspicions about the MHP…will determine the nature of the coalition 
government to be formed. DSP leader Bülent Ecevit … stressed on the day after 
the election that forming a coalition government with the MHP would be 
mathematically very easy but politically quite difficult… 
But since the two parties do not have enough deputies to win a vote of confidence, 
they would still have to seek the support of ANAP. In fact, ANAP Chairman 
Mesut Yılmaz has already announced that his party is prepared to provide that 
support.210 
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The President gave the duty to form the government to Bülent Ecevit, who – –
after extensive talks and bargaining– – was able to form the coalition on 28 May 1999, 
overcoming the above mentioned difficulties. Despite the continuous differences of 
opinion among the coalition partners and widely shared expectations of a breakup of the 
coalition from the beginning, 57th Government of Turkey was able to stay in office until 
the early elections 3 November 2002, where all three of the coalition partners faced a 
huge defeat.  
In sum, the 57th Government of Turkey came to office through regular elections, 
which led to the formation of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. However, no linkage was 
detected between the regime and foreign policy change. The study, thus, demonstrated 
no applicability of the domestic regime change dimension to foreign policy change.  
 
B.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy 
 
Except for the improvement of relations with neighboring Greece, which was dealt 
in detail above, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition did not show a different foreign policy 
orientation from its predecessors. The coalition basically continued with the traditional 
carrot and stick policies and pro status quo approach on major foreign policy issues 
such as the Cyprus conflict, Armenian issue or the US-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations. 
Even in the context of Turkish Greek rapprochement, it might be argued that the 
problem solving efforts were mainly limited to low politics issues, and were not able to 
touch the essential conflicts between the two countries such as the Aegean and Cyprus. 
In sum, Turkish foreign policy makers continued with the status quo in the major 
issues of the country. Thus, foreign policy orientation in this period had a negative 
impact on foreign policy change, i.e. led to continuity. 
 
B.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime 
 
During DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the degree of cohesiveness among the 
coalition partners was very low and fragile. Coalition partners’ differences of opinion 
and different world views revealed in many instances, most notably on the Öcalan issue 
and on the relations with the EU.  
Concerning the Öcalan issue, Prime Minister Ecevit and his biggest parliamentary 
ally Bahçeli disagreed in public over whether to push for the execution of Kurdish 
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terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan. Bahçeli clearly supported the death penalty for Öcalan 
and rejected warnings that the execution would damage Turkey's hopes of becoming a 
full member to the EU211, whereas Ecevit warned his coalition allies that Turkey's bid to 
join Europe would suffer, if it did not delay the legal process against Öcalan212.  
Finally after long discussions, the coalition government decided to postpone the 
execution of Öcalan until the European Court of Human Rights completed a review of 
the case213.  
Another example of a low degree of cohesiveness among coalition partners 
occurred with regard to the election of the new President. Prime Minister Ecevit warned 
of possible turmoil in Turkey's coalition government after a consensus to re-elect 
President Süleyman Demirel apparently broke down. The gradual escalation of tension 
between Ecevit and Yılmaz over a constitutional amendment to change the procedures 
for the election of the president resolved only after long debates.214. Prime Minister 
Ecevit was in favor of amending the Constitution so to allow President a second term in 
power215. After convincing Yılmaz, coalition parties submitted to Parliament 
constitutional reforms designed to allow President Demirel to stand for a second 
term216. However, a different opinion also came from MHP leader Bahçeli saying “In 
democracies, nobody is indispensable”, indirectly referring to President Demirel217. On 
29 March 2000218 and 5 April 2000219, the coalition government failed two times to 
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gather enough votes to pass a constitutional reform. After this parliamentary defeat, 
Prime Minister Ecevit urged his two coalition allies to stand united behind a single 
candidate to replace President Demirel220, a decision he repeatedly warned might 
destabilize the coalition government221. On 24 April, coalition leaders eventually agreed 
to name Constitutional Court Chief Justice Ahmet Necdet Sezer as their joint candidate. 
Later the opposition leaders also agreed to back Sezer. Thus, on 5 May 2000, Sezer was 
elected 10th president of Turkey with a clear 330-vote majority in the 550-seat Turkish 
Parliament222. 
On 6 May 2000, citing deep differences in democratic understanding between 
himself and Prime Minister Ecevit, State Minister Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik from ANAP 
resigned from his post223. On 8 May 2000, at the request of Prime Minister Ecevit, 
President Demirel sacked State Minister Sadi Somuncuoğlu from MHP from the 
Cabinet224 due to entering the race for Presidency, despite a government decision to 
back Sezer225. 
The sensitivities due to EU reforms added up to the already obvious lack of 
cohesiveness among coalition partners. For example, although Prime Minister Ecevit 
frequently stated the need for the lifting of the death penalty, MHP strongly opposed it, 
saying that this would encourage Kurdish separatists226. Similarly, Deputy Prime 
Minister Mesut Yılmaz's statement that the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 
(TRT) could broadcast programs in Kurdish initiated a fierce debate. Despite the 
coalition government announcing that it accepted the Accession Partnership Document, 
the differing views held by the coalition's two right-wing partners, MHP and ANAP, 
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regarding the document, surfaced with this development. The EU's demand that Turkey 
should grant cultural rights to Kurds was sparking a sharp debate in Turkey, with some 
politicians and military officers suggesting that Europe's price for membership might be 
too high227. 
In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the degree of cohesiveness among 
the coalition partners was very low and fragile, most notably on the Öcalan issue and on 
the relations with the EU. Thus, it could be asserted that the lack of political 
cohesiveness negatively impacted foreign policy change. 
 
B.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime 
 
The main opposition party FP was very much concerned with its own problems. 
The most important issue on pro-Islamic FP’s agenda was the closure case against it at 
the Constitutional Court on charges that is the successor of the already banned RP. 
Officials of the FP argued before the Court that their party was not guilty of anti-secular 
activities and should not be banned, while Turkey's powerful military accused FP of 
assisting in the rise of radical groups228.  
Another weakening factor for FP was the inner competition for leadership. FP 
leader Recai Kutan announced that he would be a candidate for the chairmanship at the 
party congress on 14 May 2000, whereas the ‘reformist’ wing inside the FP launched a 
bid for control of the party with Abdullah Gül announcing his candidacy for the party 
leadership elections229. Kutan could only be narrowly re-elected as chairman beating the 
challenge from reformists who called on the party to concentrate more on social issues 
and less on religion230. 
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In July 2000, Former Prime Minister and leader of the banned RP Necmettin 
Erbakan was permanently barred from politics due to the Court of Cassation's 
confirmation of a one-year jail sentence imposed on the politician. Erbakan would be 
required to serve a four-month reduced sentence in jail. FP started intensive bargaining 
with the coalition parties in order to have overturned the one-year jail sentence and 
lifelong political ban imposed upon Erbakan231, while Former Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in an attempt to avoid being 
jailed232.  
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the main opposition 
party FP and banned two of its deputies on charges of being the center of fundamentalist 
activity233. On 20 July 2001, Turkish Islamists launched the new Saadet Partisi (SP) so 
that some 51 deputies of the banned FP joined the new party234.  
The conflict within Turkey's main opposition party FP reached a peak when 
Greater Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek demanded the establishment of a brand new 
center right party235. 
Military 
Military’s role was sensed strongly during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition 
government. In April 2000, Turkish military declared that it is ‘unthinkable’ that the 
generals should not have a say on who will serve as the country's next president. “The 
Armed Forces have certain ideas about the principles and desired qualities of, for 
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example, the person who will be president”, a military statement said, adding, “Such 
thoughts are conveyed to the parties concerned when deemed necessary”236. 
It is more remarkable that the Prime Minister accepted the role of the army by 
saying “The armed forces' interest in the presidential election is very natural”. Ecevit 
also disclosed that Kıvrıkoğlu visited him and “relayed his expectations and wishes 
regarding the presidential election. Those are the wishes of a valuable commander who 
... knows the country's problems very well”237. 
The relations of the coalition government with the military became tense in the 
context of EU reforms. Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz was quoted as saying that 
Turkey's powerful military fears that adopting the reforms required for European Union 
membership could lead to a breakup of the country238.  
A former deputy chief of General Staff retired General Çevik Bir indicated the 
military’s sensitivity by stating that the National Security Council (MGK) might be a 
marginal topic for the West, but that Turkey needed the military in the MGK and that 
the West should support it239. Moreover, the military declared on 7 December 2000 its 
concern about PKK using Turkey's path to EU membership to win politically what they 
failed to achieve in armed struggle240. 
However, the military strongly denied press reports that it opposed possible 
membership in the EU. Stressing that to attain the level of civilized nations was a target 
set forth by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, the military 
emphasized that it was impossible to think that the Turkish military would be against 
integration with the western world. While giving an open support to the EU 
membership policies, the military stated that its point was they did want to negotiate 
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some terms and the membership should not mean accepting each and every EU 
condition241. 
President 
When Sezer was elected as the 10th president of Turkey, he was not well-known to 
political circles, unlike his predecessors Özal and Demirel, who both served as Prime 
Ministers before and later became Presidents. Sezer’s political leanings remained 
unexplored.  
However, it was notable that on the day that Sezer was announced as a 
presidential candidate, he said that the presidential powers granted by the Constitution 
exceeded the boundaries of a parliamentary democracy. He emphasized that he would 
be a neutral president and also stressed his commitment to Atatürk's principles and 
secularism. Sezer also signaled he would take the lead in taking steps towards 
democratization in Turkey. Thus, Sezer became President with support from across the 
whole political spectrum, enjoying both inner- and extra-parliamentary support, which 
was the case for the first time in Turkey242. This provided him with a uniquely strong 
role.  
In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, opposition actors’ were the main 
opposition party FP, the military, and the President Sezer. However, the strength of 
political opposition performed by these actors varied. The main opposition party was 
concerned more about its inner turmoil and the closure case, thus performed a rather 
weak opposition concerning foreign policy issues. The traditionally strong military in 
Turkey, although having reservations about the EU conditions, created no major 
obstacle to government’s policies. Similarly, the newly elected President Sezer has not 
yet asserted his power and influence in the foreign policy area during DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition. Thus, the overall strength of political opposition in this period remained low. 
The study demonstrated that low political opposition showed no impact on foreign 
policy change in traditionally sensitive policy areas. 
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k.htm 
 73 
B.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues 
 
The level of polarization over foreign policy issues remained low except for two 
instances. First, concerning the Öcalan case, a certain tension revealed itself both among 
coalition partners and between the coalition and other political actors. Secondly, as 
regards to the Turkey-EU relations, the reform demands of the EU led to further 
polarization over military’s role in Turkish politics and extension of more cultural rights 
to ethnic minorities. In sum, there was a polarization limited to certain sensitivities. 
However, this factor had no impact on foreign policy change in major issues of the 
country. 
 
B.6. Regime Vulnerability 
 
DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition endured a governmental period of high regime 
vulnerability derived from various sources. The fact of being a coalition government, 
particularly a coalition composed of parties with totally different worldviews, caused 
vulnerability itself and raised calls for early elections from the beginning.  
In 2000, MHP insisted on sending Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of their junior 
coalition partner ANAP, to the Supreme Court to face charges of corruption and 
irregularities. While Yılmaz was cleared of all charges against him, this created a rift 
within the coalition243. Yılmaz's appointment to the Cabinet as Minister for EU Affairs 
further complicated relations between the two parties”244. 
Another source of vulnerability was the Kurdish issue. During this period from 
1999 to 2002, although Öcalan was captured, Turkey had to deal with continued 
separatist terrorism by PKK. Turkish military was actively fighting terrorists, mainly in 
Southeastern Turkey. The Emergency Rule (OHAL) had to be routinely extended by the 
Parliament245. Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu ruled out the possibility 
                                                 
243 Coalition survives rift in June. İlnur Çevik. 9.7.2000. 
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of downsizing forces in the country's Southeast for that time being246 since the pressure 
and threat continued to exist.  
Furthermore, Öcalan’s legal process complicated the picture. Turkey captured 
Öcalan in Kenya and then tried him for treason for leading a campaign for Kurdish 
autonomy in which tens of thousands of people were killed. In 1999, a Turkish court 
sentenced him to death by hanging, holding him responsible for the deaths of the 
thousands of people who have been killed in the conflict since 1984. The government 
has delayed the execution until the European Court of Human Rights ruled on Öcalan's 
appeal.  
However, the case could prove an additional irritant between Turkey and Europe 
at a time when anger at conditions laid down for EU membership is running high 
in Turkey…A court ruling against the death penalty and criticism of the legal 
process would provoke a harsh reaction in Turkey where nationalistic sentiment 
runs strongly on the issue. It could also, especially if coinciding with a rift with 
the EU on membership conditions, stir up disunity between government coalition 
parties.247  
 
Only after the EU reform packages passed from the Parliament in October 2002, 
State Security Court formally lifted the death sentence passed on PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan. Court commuted Öcalan's death sentence to life imprisonment in line with the 
law that lifted the death penalty except for times of war248.  
Another source of vulnerability for the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was due 
economic crises.  
The first occurred in November 2000, while Turkey was implementing the 
standby agreement that was signed in December 1999 with the IMF. The goal of the 
program was to bring in economic stability and cause inflation to fall. Indeed, this 
stability program was considered as the last chance for Turkey. A small deviation meant 
a return to the days of chaos. The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government seemed 
determined to implement the stability program. However, on 21 November, it was 
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revealed that the implementation was in fact not on track. As the crisis that started in the 
banking sector, spread and turned into a fiscal crisis, $7 billion left Turkey in a 
fortnight. Turkey could get over this crisis only with $7.5 billion additional funds 
provided by IMF again249.  
On 19 February 2001, Turkey faced an ever bigger crisis. For the first time in the 
history of the National Security Council (MGK), a prime minister stormed out accusing 
the President of preaching at him in a manner ‘beyond the rules of politeness or the 
traditions of the state’ and that ‘a very serious state crisis’ has arisen. President Sezer 
was criticizing Ecevit for sheltering corruption and irregularities. This incident 
prompted a sharp fall in Turkey's markets, showing the underlying fragility of the 
country's troubled economy250. Thus, the seventeenth standby agreement was 
interrupted and the crisis upset all of the economic balances251. 
The latter crisis raised questions about the credibility of Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit and the ability of the economy administration of the country, while the 
opposition parties were calling for early elections252. As a remedy, Ecevit invited Kemal 
Derviş to Turkey to restore the country’s financial credentials.  
A former academic and adviser to Ecevit in the 1970s, Derviş was Vice President 
for poverty reduction and economic management at the World Bank. Turkish media 
hailed Derviş as the savior of the economy, though he repeatedly underlined that this 
was team business. Commentators underlined that Derviş would be a key figure in 
Turkey's relations with the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury”253. 
“There will be a single boss, a single ruler and defender of the economy”, Sabah 
newspaper columnist Bilal Çetin wrote. “Turkey found the most appropriate, the best 
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name for this mission”. “Kemal Derviş from the World Bank...is presented as a 
magician of the economy by some people”, said Ali Sirmen, columnist in Cumhuriyet 
newspaper. “Although he refuses such labels and says that one person cannot handle 
this task alone and that it is a matter of team work, it is hard to show this reality to a 
society which is accustomed to be distracted with magicians and miracles”. Derviş’s 
appointment as a super minister caused some tension within the coalition. Radikal 
newspaper reported that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli had threatened to dissolve the 
coalition rather than give up his party's economic responsibilities. Bahçeli was quoted as 
saying he supported the appointment only out of ‘courtesy to the coalition’ but at least 
Derviş might help Turkey win new loans254.  
On 14 April 2001, Kemal Dervis laid out the economic program to pull the 
country out of the economic crisis but warned that he needed unyielding support in 
Parliament to succeed and attract foreign financial support255. According to the MHP, 
Dervis was acting like a fourth partner in the coalition and regarded himself as an equal 
of the coalition leaders, not just a cabinet minister256. 
The coalition’s vulnerability grew further with 75 year old Ecevit’s health 
problems. In May 2002, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was hospitalized two times. 
Economy Minister Kemal Derviş made the first statement calling for early elections to 
decrease uncertainty, which was followed by opposition parties. Ailing Prime Minister 
Ecevit confronted growing calls for his resignation, insisting he was in good shape and 
would remain at the head of the government.  
By June 2002, besides Ecevit’s health condition, MHP leader Bahçeli declared 
that his party would oppose key rights reforms sought by the European Union and if 
necessary would abandon the coalition and pave the way to the establishment of a new 
government. On 7 July 2002, Bahçeli finally called for early elections on November 3.  
The opposition within DSP became evident. First, Prime Minister Ecevit's former 
right-hand-man Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan resigned, which was 
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followed by Foreign Minister İsmail Cem’s resignation, who announced the creation of 
the Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP).  
In mid July 2002, coalition leaders agreed to early elections on 3 November after 
their government lost its majority in Parliament. 
In August, Economy Minister Derviş resigned, and formally joined the CHP to run 
for November elections.  
In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition the regime vulnerability was very 
high due to the Kurdish issue, economic crises, and Ecevit’s own health problems. 
Regime vulnerability factor weakened the potential of the coalition to make major 
changes and, thus, had a negative impact on the foreign policy change, i.e. led to 
continuity. 
 
 
C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process 
 
 
C.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity 
 
During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, a major issue between the 
government and bureaucracy indicating to a bureaucratic rigidity was not revealed in 
mass media. However, at this point, it might be important to underline the friction 
between Yılmaz and Cem. Relations with the EU were mainly the Foreign Ministry's 
responsibility, until İsmail Cem had to share this responsibility with Yılmaz. This 
caused a certain climate of coolness between the two. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
announced that Yılmaz's responsibility was limited to coordinating EU-related activities 
at domestic level, and that the ‘external coordination’ continues to be the Foreign 
Ministry's responsibility. However, it was not always easy to draw that line clearly.257. 
Thus, Yılmaz preferred to work with his ‘own’ bureaucracy by forming the Secretariat 
General for the EU Affairs under the Prime Ministry. 
In sum, the study revealed bureaucratic rigidity factor was not applicable to 
foreign policy change during this period. 
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C.2. Leadership Dynamics 
 
The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government was headed by the veteran politician 
Bülent Ecevit from DSP, who fulfilled the duty of Prime Minister four times before the 
57th Government. In his political career of almost fifty years, he was known as a left 
wing, secular politician whose name was identified with freedom and honesty. 
Throughout his career, he had to make many bold decisions including the Cyprus 
intervention in 1974258. Ecevit, as the founder of DSP enjoyed unchallenged authority 
and solid support of his party members until the last months of the 57th Government. 
Ecevit, when he headed the CHP in the pre-1980 coup, had to struggle with 
several opposing factions, so he did not want such elements of potential rift within his 
new party when the DSP was founded in 1985. Bülent Ecevit and his wife selected even 
the local party people very carefully and immediately weeded out any potential form of 
dissent259. On 29 April 2001, Ecevit was re-elected chairman of the ruling Democratic 
Left Party (DSP) despite claims that he would retire and name a crown prince to replace 
him260.  
Devlet Bahçeli, as the more moderate and conciliatory leader of far right 
nationalist MHP after Alparslan Türkeş, had support from his party. Bahçeli was re-
elected as the chairman of the party at the General Convention in 2000261. 
Mesut Yılmaz was able to cast 921 of the 1,227 votes at ANAP Convention, 
winning a comfortable victory despite criticism from rival candidates who blame 
Yılmaz for halving the party's electoral strength in his 10 years as leader262.  
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In sum, the leaders of the coalition parties were individually strong in their 
political parties, but the leadership of the coalition was weak. This diluted foreign 
policy change, i.e. led to continuity. 
 
C.3. Decision-making Process 
 
During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, foreign policy decisions were 
taken according to the 1982 Constitution263 with its main emphasis on a strong 
executive authority. According to the Constitution, the main actors of foreign policy 
decision-making are the President, the Parliament, Prime Minister and the Cabinet, 
National Security Council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The 1982 Constitution transformed the Presidency from a symbolic post into an 
active and powerful one, but still the President shares his executive authority with the 
Prime Minister. The Parliament is the main legislative body. Yet the President may send 
the legislation back to the Parliament for reconsideration. If the Parliament passes the 
same law again, the President has to sign it. Although Ahmet Necdet Sezer was not 
excessively using his executive powers, he employed the Presidential veto option more 
frequently than previous Presidents. 
The Prime Minister is the effective head of the executive branch and the 
coordinator and supervisor of the Cabinet. According to Article 109 of the 1982 
Constitution, ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the 
President.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible of conducting foreign policy on 
behalf of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Thus the Foreign Minister is a key figure 
in implementation of the foreign policy decisions.  
National Security Council (MGK) is an advisory body headed by the President 
and composed of the Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of 
National Defense, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs as well as the Commanders of 
the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, so 
it is composed of five civilian and five military key figures. The National Security 
Council’s formal function is to provide to the Council of Ministers its views concerning 
national security policy of the state but practically speaking, the National Security 
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from Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay-eski1.htm 
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Council represents, in a way, the strong influence and involvement of Turkish military 
in civilian politics. 
During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the role of National Security Council was 
a hot issue, since one of the stickiest issues of the Accession Partnership Document was 
the status of the National Security Council in Turkish politics. European politicians 
have frequently remarked that the EU could not accept that the Turkish military was too 
powerful in politics. The EU Commission has told Turkey through the document that 
the status of the National Security Council should be retailored in a fashion that would 
be equivalent of its similar institutions in EU countries. Despite the Chief of General 
Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu claimed that the Turkish military was fully backing 
the policy of integration with the EU, he also voiced his caution as well. The 
government found itself in a difficult position to find a formula that would both please 
the EU and not offend the military264. 
Again during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, the Parliament for the 
first time since the approval of the 1982 Constitution passed the biggest Constitutional 
amendment package of 37 articles in line with Turkey's National Program, in an 
extraordinary session on 17 September 2002. The most crucial articles of the package 
were basic rights and freedoms, broadcasting in Kurdish and capital punishment265. 
In sum, foreign policy decision-making in this era was based on the 1982 
Constitution with an emphasis on executive power and an influential role of the 
National Security Council (MGK), but this factor had no impact on foreign policy 
change.  
 
Summary of the Findings 
 
During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the study revealed the following findings 
about foreign policy change: 
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Concerning international factors, change in systemic conditions had no impact. 
Regional developments proved to be issue specific. While the war in Kosovo did not 
lead to a foreign policy change, EU enlargement’s impact varied from issue to issue. It 
had a positive impact on foreign policy change regarding Turkish-Greek and Turkey-
EU relations, whereas it had no impact on the Armenian issue. In relation with the 
Cyprus conflict, European enlargement had a negative impact on foreign policy change, 
i.e. led to continuity. Foreign commitments also provided issue specific findings: In 
Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations, they had a positive impact, i.e. led to 
foreign policy change, whereas concerning the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, 
the study revealed no impact on foreign policy change. 
Concerning domestic factors, domestic regime change was not applicable; 
different orientations to foreign policy, political cohesiveness of the new regime, and 
regime vulnerability had a negative impact on foreign policy change, while low political 
opposition and low polarization had no impact. 
Concerning political agency and decision-making process, bureaucratic rigidity 
was not applicable; leadership dynamics had a negative impact, whereas decision-
making process had no impact on foreign policy change. 
The next chapter deals with an in depth analysis of foreign policy change of the 
ruling AKP Government along the same analytical dimensions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
THE 58
th
 AND 59
th
 GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY 
 
 
The 3 November 2002 Elections resulted with a remarkable electoral victory of 
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Welfare Party]266. According to the 
election results, AKP gained 34.28 % of the total votes and secured 363 of 550 seats in 
the Parliament, so it formed the new government as a single party. CHP Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi [Republican People’s Party] that was not able to enter the Parliament in the 
18 April 1999 Elections, ranked second in 3 November 2002 Elections with 19.39 % 
and this time was able to enter the Parliament with 178 parliamentarians. AKP, despite 
having an ongoing legal party closure case, became the first political party in Turkey’s 
electoral history that won the government without having a definite candidate for the 
Prime Minister position. AKP’s party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not allowed to 
run for the 3 November 2002 Elections as a parliamentary candidate, since he served 
four months of a 10-month jail sentence for Islamist sedition in the late 1990s and was 
therefore banned from the Parliament. He could enter the Parliament only later through 
the 9 March 2003 Parliamentary Renewal Elections of Siirt, a small city in Southeastern 
Turkey. Once Erdoğan was elected as the Siirt MP from AKP, Abdullah Gül, who 
formed the 58th Turkish Government, resigned and left his Prime Minister seat for 
Erdoğan.  
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It was the first time after 1987 Elections that a single party was able to cast 
enough votes to form the government on its own. With this electoral success, AKP 
chronologically became the fourth party, which formed a one-party majority 
government, since 1950: DP Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party] had formed 
governments three times on its own, AP Adalet Partisi [Justice Party] and ANAP 
Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party] had managed it two times each. Furthermore, AKP 
became the political party that won the second largest number of seats in the Parliament, 
after DP’s 419 seats in 1957 Elections267. 
Again it was the first time after 1946 that only two political parties were 
represented in the Parliament. 3 November 2002 Elections witnessed the biggest 
political ‘purification’ of the Turkish Republican history: for the first time, 89 % of the 
parliamentary seats were replaced with 490 newly elected MPs. Most significantly, all 
three coalition partners that formed the previous government were not able to pass the 
10 % threshold. DSP Demokratik Sol Parti [Democratic Left Party] gained only 1.22 % 
of the votes, whereas MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [Nationalist Movement Party] 
scored 8.36 % and ANAP Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party] 5.13 %. In total, the 
coalition partners suffered a decrease of 68 % of votes altogether as compared to 1999 
Elections. Similarly, the two opposition parties represented in the previous Parliament 
namely DYP Doğru Yol Partisi [Right Way Party] and SP Saadet Partisi [Happiness 
Party] lost a significant number of votes and remained below the 10 % threshold. Thus, 
one can argue that all of the mainstream parties of the 1999 polls suffered a humiliating 
defeat. Only the GP Genç Parti [Young Party] of media-business tycoon Cem Uzan 
was coming closer to the threshold. With 3 November 2002 Elections, only 54.67 % of 
the total valid votes could be represented by the two political parties that entered into 
the Parliament and 45.33 % of the voters’ choices could not be corresponded at 
parliamentary level due to the threshold problem. 
Following the elections, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer designated Abdullah Gül 
to form the new government, since AKP’s party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not 
become a Prime Minister because of the court verdict banning him from making 
parliamentary politics. Thus, the 58th Turkish Government was formed by AKP under 
Gül’s leadership on 18 November 2002. This first AKP government stayed in office 
until 14 March 2003, when it was replaced by the 59th Government that was formed by 
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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who became the Prime Minister, following the Siirt Elections. 
During the 58th Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by Yaşar Yakış, 
whereas in the 59th Government, which is still in office, Abdullah Gül became the 
current Foreign Minister of Turkey.  
According to the Program of the 58th Government268 announced on 23 November 
2002, AKP made the following commitments concerning foreign policy:  
• Following a prejudice- and obsession-free, realist foreign policy respecting 
territorial integrity and sovereignty and based on mutual interests, which would suit 
Turkey’s historical and geographical position.  
• Redefinition of foreign policy priorities according to the changing global and 
regional realities, and setting of a new balance between these realities and Turkey’s 
national interests. In this framework: 
o Harmonizing with a long term perspective Turkey’s foreign policy with the 
global and regional conjuncture based on new dynamics. 
o Cooperation with official research centers, foreign policy institutes and 
international relations departments of universities.  
o As a stabilizing factor in its region, Turkey will take more initiatives in the 
nearby crisis areas and attempt to contribute to the resolution of these crises 
in a more concrete way. Turkey will follow an active diplomacy, which 
would not just observe the regional and continental developments, but also 
direct them.  
o Making efforts for the establishment of security and stability in nearby 
regions and enhanced efforts for the continuation of neighborly relations 
based on dialogue, thus contributing more to regional cooperation, which is 
also an important element for Turkey’s economic development.  
• Continuing close relations with Europe. Placing the relations with European 
countries to the top of the foreign policy agenda.  
• Full membership to the EU is the main goal. Working for the opening of accession 
negotiations. Decisiveness for fulfilling Copenhagen Criteria fully. In this 
framework: 
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o Development and strengthening of legal reforms passed from the Parliament 
and ensuring their full application.  
o Working for fulfilling the economic criteria and financial cooperation.  
• Continuation of efforts to participate in European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI), parallel to Turkey’s contribution so far to NATO. Continuation with 
military activities under NATO, UN and OSCE frameworks.  
• Enhanced cooperation in various fields with friends and allies.  
• Supporting international cooperation against terrorism. Making active efforts for 
decreasing the tensions between religions and cultures that escalated by Sept.11th 
attacks, and securing a global peace environment. Mobilizing our rich historical 
accumulation based on cultural pluralism and dialogue.  
• Continuation of lengthy and overwhelmingly defense based relations with the US, 
and expansion of cooperation to other areas like economy, investment, science and 
technology.  
• Good neighborly relations with the Russian Federation.  
• Continuation of relations with our neighbor Greece based on mutual economic 
interests, and by creating a security environment through these relations, building 
ground for the resolution more complicated political conflicts.  
• Necessity to find a solution of the Cyprus Conflict by all means. This resolution 
should not allow any danger for the continuity of the future Turkish presence in the 
island. In this framework, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s peace initiative is 
welcomed, while foreseeing a negotiation process for a durable resolution of the 
conflict that would guarantee Turkey’s national interests and the presence and 
sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriots.  
• Improvement of relations with Middle Asian Turkic Republics.  
• Concern about the continuing violent conflict in Middle East.  Commitment for a 
sustainable peace. Continuation of efforts along the UN Resolutions for ensuring of 
peace that end ongoing suffering of Palestinians. Contribution to the creation of 
peace by maintenance of good relations with both Palestine and Israel.  
• Policy on Balkans to be developed and reshaped if necessary in the light of 
historical, cultural and economic relations. Developing economy based projects for 
decreasing tensions and sustaining peace in the region.  
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• Special attention to be given to relations with the Arab world. Enhancing bilateral 
relations and making efforts for increasing dynamism and international credibility of 
Islam Conference Organization (ICO).  
• Making efforts for mobilizing the potential for cooperation under Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Organization (BECO).  
• Worries about the uncertainty in Iraq. Underlining the significance of Iraq’s 
territorial integrity and political unity whose alteration might affect the balance in 
Middle East. Iraq should fully apply UN Resolutions, abandon any weapons of mass 
destruction, and follow peaceful neighborly relations. Favoring a place for Iraq in 
the international community and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.  
• Enhancing relations with China and Japan based on mutual respect and productive 
cooperation.  
• Adding to our traditional foreign policy dimensions of Atlantic and Europe, a 
Eurasian policy. In this framework, cooperation under Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO).  
• Ensuring a rational and systematic coordination of efforts among Turkey’s 
memberships to various international and regional organizations.  
• Leaving Cold War paradigms behind, making efforts to contribute to the link of 
Caucasia with Middle East and Balkans in economic terms.  
• Facilitating conditions for Turkish citizens living abroad.  
The Program of the 59th Government269, which was made public on 19 March 
2002 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, included the following additional highlights on Turkish 
foreign policy, in addition to repeating and confirming the Program of the first AKP 
Government:  
• Sept. 11th attacks started a new era in political history. This new era brought the pain 
and suffering of the unipolar world order. Turkey has always been a central factor in 
global power systems, and is naturally affected by these new developments. 
Turkey’s regional Lebensraum corresponds to high risk geopolitics. Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policy dimensions are closely interrelated. Turkish foreign 
policy directly affects the economy of the layman, and similarly, a strong and high 
quality domestic politics is the guarantee for Turkey’s global and regional interests. 
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• Facing the changing global and regional realities, Turkey needs to redefine its 
foreign policy priorities and set up a new balance between these realities and its 
national interests. In this framework, the 59th Government is determined to continue 
and to develop further the realist and visional foreign policy approach of the first 
AKP Government.  
• Turkey is stability factor it its region. Based on this feature, Turkey will take more 
initiatives in nearby crisis areas and attempt to contribute to the resolution of these 
crises in a more concrete way. The approach developed by the first AKP 
Government concerning the crisis in Iraq succeeded to be a serious model for the 
world and was appreciated. Turkey will continue with the active diplomacy.  The 
performance laid by the first AKP Government regarding the crisis in Iraq will be 
maintained exactly. 
• Our party supports US’ war against global terrorism started after Sept. 11th and it 
became the first party to express the need for common grounds for combating global 
terrorism. Both our governments share the same understanding.  However, we are 
concerned about the confusion and methodological mistakes arising regarding this 
issue.  
• Our government’s is in favor of ending of uncertainty in Iraq. We hope that the 
conflict in Iraq will be resolved under UN framework. However, in case our 
political, military and economic interests are threatened, we will swiftly take the 
most appropriate decisions arising from our special circumstances. Our government 
attributes special importance to the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity and 
political unity. We desire that Turkmens, Arabs, Kurds, and other populations 
constituting Iraq continue living together peacefully.  
• Our government will maintain its relations with US based on historical depth and 
mutual respect in the most dynamic way. It is natural that there are some differences 
of perception and approach towards the crisis in Iraq between Turkey and US. 
Certainly, every country evaluates each event according to its political position. 
Despite these differences, the basic strategic and political reality is the ally 
relationship between Turkey and US. Our government desires to enhance relations 
and cooperation with US along the mutual interests and to the benefit of our 
populations and constituting a dimension of regional stability.  
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• Turkey is a part of the system European political values. We have succeeded to 
produce a considerable activity and to receive a date for accession negotiations. We 
thank CHP for supporting the legislation of harmonization package.  
• During the first AKP Government, Turkey succeeded to be granted its well earned 
place in European Security and Defense Identity.  
• Concerning the Cyprus Conflict, we invite all politically interested parties, 
particularly EU member states and Greece, to be sensitive for a resolution based on 
dialogue and sustainable peace. In this framework, we underline that UN Secretary 
General’s plan is on the table, that he has offered his good offices in the resolution 
process upon parties’ consent, and that TRNC President Mr. Denktaş’s has invited 
the Greek Cypriots to the negotiation table.   
• Concerning Middle East, we support the roadmap and the vision for reform in US 
President Bush’s speech on 14 March 2002.  
For the sake of simplicity, we will cover the period of the two AKP Governments 
starting from 3 November 2002 Elections and still continuing as a whole. During this 
period, developments concerning traditionally “sensitive” policy areas such as the 
Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Greek relations and the relations with the 
European Union that were inherited from previous periods, continued to occupy the 
heavy foreign policy agenda of Turkey. The following gives a detailed account of 
related events in this period:  
Turkish-Greek Relations 
During the AKP government, Turkish- Greek relations continued on a good basis 
despite two small-scale crises occurred in 2005. One of them was related to the Aegean 
problems, the other one concerned friendly relations.  
In April 2005, Turkish Foreign Minister Gül and his Greek counterpart Moliviatis 
agreed to deepen their cooperation by introducing three more confidence-building 
measures in the Aegean and pledged to support efforts to develop multidimensional 
bilateral ties270. 
Turkish and Greek authorities managed to defuse tension in the Aegean after coast 
guard boats from both countries confronted each other in a standoff near the disputed 
Kardak (Imia) rocks in January 2005, whilst the foreign ministers of the two countries 
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announced new confidence-building measures271. Turkey reiterated that there was no 
plan to revise Turkey's Aegean policy, after a Greek newspaper quoted Gül as saying 
that he had no objection to canceling a parliamentary statement declaring any Greek 
attempt to extend Greece's territorial waters to 12 miles as casus belli. While Parliament 
Speaker Arınç from AKP suggested that the policy should be revised in light of the 
current Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Turkish General Staff declared it as a state 
policy, which is still valid and in force272. 
The crisis concerning friendly relations happened due to the desecration of the 
Turkish flag during a goodwill visit by Turkish officers and military students to the 
Greek War College in April 2005. Soon after this incident, Greek military officials 
ordered an investigation273, and the Turkish General Staff received a letter of apology 
from its Greek counterpart274.  
The same month, Foreign Minister Gül appealed to the media to support 
improvement in Turkish-Greek relations and avoid coverage that could discourage 
politicians in both countries from pursuing conciliation efforts275. 
In sum, the rapprochement process in Turkish-Greek relations that was initiated by 
the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition continued and developed in this period.  
Relations with the EU  
Turkey-EU relations entered a new phase during the AKP Government. 
Copenhagen European Council decisions of 12 December 2002 confirmed that  
The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession 
negotiations with Turkey without delay.276  
 
Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and the then unofficial leader of Turkey Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan emerged from Copenhagen disillusioned. Even so, Gül underlined the 
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fact that an EU invitation to begin entry talks after a 2004 review is a step forward in 
the Muslim country's decades-long effort to join the affluent bloc277. 
After successful legislation of reform packages in Turkish Parliament during 
2003, European Commission evaluated Turkey’s progress as the following: 
Overall, in the past 12 months Turkey has made further impressive legislative 
efforts which constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with 
the Copenhagen political criteria. Turkey should address the outstanding issues 
highlighted in this report, with particular attention to the strengthening of the 
independence and the functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework for the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), the 
further alignment of civil-military relations with European practice, the situation 
in the Southeast and cultural rights. Turkey should ensure full and effective 
implementation of reforms to ensure that Turkish citizens can enjoy human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in line with European standards. Furthermore, Turkey 
should provide determined support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem.278 
 
President of the European Parliament Pat Cox arrived in Ankara for talks on 1 
March 2004, becoming the first European Parliament head to visit Turkey. Cox praised 
Turkey for the reform steps it has accomplished but urged the country to commit itself 
to implementing the reforms, if it is to succeed in its ultimate goal of EU 
membership279. 
On various occasions, US administration reiterated its strong support for Turkey's 
bid to join the EU. “Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the 
exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the supposed ‘clash of 
civilizations’ as a passing myth of history”280 Bush said in a speech delivered in 
İstanbul. 
On 6 October 2004, Turkey managed to get its long-awaited positive 
recommendation from EU Commission executives to start accession talks 281, but the 
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go-ahead came with several conditions attached. Rebuffing last-minute efforts by 
Ankara, the Commission said in its report that talks could be suspended if Turkey 
backtracked on democratization and human rights reforms. Such a suspension would 
require a qualified majority vote from EU ministers. Accession talks would ‘be an open-
ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand’, the Commission 
reported. It proposed no opening date, leaving the final decision on whether-and-when 
to EU leaders at European Council of 17 December 2004. The start of talks, according 
to the Commission's recommendation, is conditional on Turkey bringing into force 
outstanding legal reforms, most notably of the Turkish Penal Code and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, which are in the pipeline282. 
Finally, 16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council decisions included a 
date to start accession negotiations with Turkey: 
…Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; the European Union will open 
accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. The European Council 
welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process 
and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform...  
The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding 
the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten 
new Member States...  
In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that ‘the Turkish Government 
confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara 
Agreement prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching 
agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the 
current membership of the European Union’... 
The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to 
good neighborly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with 
its neighbors and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States 
concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with 
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter...  
It requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening 
negotiations on 3 October 2005.283 
 
As early as 28 January 2005, the French National Assembly agreed upon a 
package of constitutional changes that includes a legal obligation to hold a 
referendum on the entry of any new members to the European Union, including Turkey, 
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which was later discussed and approved by the French Senate in mid February 2005284. 
French electorate voted overwhelmingly ‘no’ in the referendum held on 29 May 2005 
on the first European Union constitution.  
Although the French vote was believed to have been swayed, at least in part, by 
strong public opposition to the prospect of EU membership for Turkey, Erdoğan 
declared that France's overwhelming rejection of the European constitution in a 
referendum does not pose an ‘obstacle’ to Turkey's position in its efforts to join the 
European Union, and that Turkey would continue enthusiasm and determination to 
undertake whatever measures necessary in the negotiation process and begin accession 
talks with the EU on 3 October 2005 as scheduled285. 
Dismissing criticism of slowness and disorientation in the government's 
preparations for upcoming accession talks with the EU, AKP Government appointed the 
Cabinet's youngest minister Ali Babacan as the chief negotiator for accession talks with 
the EU286 and assured that Turkey would sign a protocol extending Turkey's customs 
union agreement with the European Union to new EU members, including Greek 
Cyprus, in a near future287. As part of one of the major EU harmonization efforts, the 
new Turkish Penal Code (TCK) became effective as of 1 June 2005 despite widely held 
reservations, particularly by the journalists criticizing the code for limiting the press288. 
In sum, this period was marked with Turkey’s long awaited receiving of a date for 
accession negotiations. AKP Government has been making efforts to prepare the 
country for the upcoming negotiations including reshaping of foreign policy, 
particularly by the extension of the Customs Union Agreement to the new member 
states including [Greek] Cyprus. 
Cyprus Conflict 
Ahead of the Copenhagen European Council of 12 December 2002, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan presented to Greek and Turkish Cypriots a revised blueprint for a 
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comprehensive settlement of the power-sharing problem on the island289. However, 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş accused the EU of seeking to build a ‘Christian 
fortress’ around Turkey and effectively ruled out a deal to reunite Cyprus before 
Copenhagen Summit. Ten thousands of Turkish Cypriots started to take to streets to call 
for the reunification of divided Cyprus before it enters the EU, organizing large pro-EU 
rallies, which were clearly signaling the growing pressure on Denktaş to accept Annan 
Plan290. 
In March 2003, Cyprus peace talks collapsed after an inconclusive meeting in The 
Hague between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
announced the end of efforts to reunite Greek and Turkish Cypriots before the island 
signed an accession treaty to the European Union291. European Commission warned 
Turkey that its bid to join the EU could suffer after the failure of UN-brokered talks to 
reunite Cyprus292. 
In April 2003, Foreign Minister Gül did not attend the EU summit where Greek 
Cypriots signed the treaty of accession. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş 
commented that the signing of an EU accession treaty by the Greek Cypriots sealed 
Cyprus's partition and reunification was only possible with Turkey's entry into the 
bloc293. In July 2003, Denktaş declared dead the Annan plan to unite Cyprus294. Turkey 
signed a far-reaching customs union framework agreement with the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (KKTC) in August 2003, despite EU’s criticism295.  
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In December 2003 elections, Turkish Cypriots voted for the Mehmet Ali Talat’s 
pro–EU Republican Turkish Party (CTP), which formed a coalition government with 
Serdar Denktaş’s Democratic Party (DP)296.  
Upon UN Secretary General’s invitation, Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos and 
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş met in New York in February 2004 under the auspices 
of the United Nations for a critical meeting in search of a deal to unify the island before 
it finally joins the EU on 1 May 2004297. Later in March 2004, Foreign Ministers of 
Turkey and Greece joined the talks in Bürgenstock in last-ditch talks on Annan Plan, 
where the leaders again failed to bridge their differences298.  
Greek and Turkish Cypriots voted on the Annan Plan to reunite Cyprus in a 
historic referendum on 24 April 2004, with Turkish Cypriots voting 64.9 % in favor of 
the plan and Greek Cypriots voting 75.8 % against. Thus, the plan became null and void 
due to the Greek Cypriot rejection299. While [Greek] Cyprus became a full member to 
the EU on 1 May 2004, Turkish Cypriot leadership started to advocate in US and EU 
capitals an end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus based on their strong ‘yes’ in the 
referendum. 
At 16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council, Turkey and the EU sealed a 
historic agreement to open membership talks on 3 October 2005 after reaching a hard-
won compromise deal to bridge sharp differences over Cyprus, which had even 
threatened to bring the negotiations to a halt. The landmark decision, which would open 
a new era for Turkey and the 25-nation bloc, came after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan announced to his EU counterparts the Turkish government's readiness to sign a 
protocol extending its customs union agreement to all members of the EU including the 
Greek Cypriot government before the effective opening of accession negotiations300. 
In February 2005, the AKP government hosted Greek Cypriot main opposition 
leader Anastasiades in Ankara. Greek Cypriot leadership protested this visit by saying 
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that Anastasiades could only reflect his own party's [Democratic Rally Party (DISI)] 
views of the Cyprus dispute during his visit to Turkey301. 
Meanwhile, both Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership repeatedly voiced their 
will for a permanent resolution to the Cyprus dispute reiterating that it was the Greek 
Cypriots who should take a step forward in order to pave the way for reaching a 
resolution formula. Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Serdar Denktaş appealed to U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to work to resume reunification talks on the divided 
island and added that the reluctant Greek Cypriot leadership must take steps to resume 
the stalled peace process302. 
Turkish Cypriots reelected pro-reunification leader Mehmet Ali Talat, who formed 
a coalition government with Serdar Denktaş in March 2005, and announced that he 
would run presidential elections in mid-April303. 
Starting from March 2005, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials started to discuss 
with the EU Commission the details of a protocol that would extend Turkey's 1963 
Association Agreement to the new members states including [Greek] Cyprus304 and 
eventually agreed on the text of the protocol305.  
Simultaneously, Erdoğan was pressing Greece and [Greek] Cyprus to take steps to 
facilitate a resumption of peace talks, emphasizing that they should be the first to act as 
Turkey has already done its share306. Greek Cypriot leadership, criticizing Annan’s 
reunification plan as biased and started to discuss possible modification proposals by 
assembling the National Council307.   
On 1 May 2005, after the historical electoral victory in presidential elections, pro-
reunification leader Mehmet Ali Talat took over the presidency in Turkish Cyprus from 
veteran Rauf Denktaş, the head of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
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(KKTC) since its establishment in 1983, underlining his commitment to work for peace 
on the island308. He issued a fresh call for Greek Cypriots to resume reunification talks, 
and asked United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to launch a new initiative for 
resolving the Cyprus dispute. Supporting Talat, Turkey reiterated Ankara's position for 
a UN plan as the best option for a just and equitable Cyprus resolution309. 
In sum, AKP Government realized a major change in Turkish foreign policy over 
Cyprus by fully supporting the Annan Plan, and actively promoting a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. 
Armenian Issue: 
Armenian issue became one of the top regional issues for AKP government in 
2005. Since 2005 was the 90th anniversary of the Armenian losses during the World 
War I years, Armenia and the influential Armenian Diaspora launched a new and 
stronger initiative for internationalizing the issue and pressuring Turkey to recognize 
genocide allegations. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül described the Armenian 
allegations of genocide as one of the most important foreign policy matters for Turkey 
while briefing members of Parliament on Turkey's foreign policy agenda310. 
 As early as February 2005, the so-called Armenian genocide allegations 
overshadowed the 53rd meeting of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission as a 
French deputy sparked harsh reactions from Turkish deputies when he displayed 
Turkey's recognition of the so-called genocide as a condition for its membership to the 
EU311.   
In March 2005, CHP leader Deniz Baykal met with Prime Minister Erdoğan for 
exchanging views on how to counter Armenian claims, while the Armenian government 
turned down a proposal offered by Erdoğan for a joint study to be conducted by Turkish 
and Armenian historians on the event312. 
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As a response, Turkey called on countries having upheld Armenian allegations of 
genocide to take the challenge to prove the validity of the charges and maintained the 
debate was manipulated by the powerful Armenian Diaspora313. 
In April 2005, a letter signed by Erdoğan and Baykal was sent to the British House 
of Lords and House of Commons as part of a united effort by the government and the 
opposition to initiate an offensive campaign to counter the Armenian genocide 
allegations314. 
Meanwhile, Turkey provided new documents to shed light on a period in the late 
Ottoman Empire in response to Armenian allegations of genocide, as Armenians across 
the world have increased efforts to win international recognition for their charges in the 
run-up to 24 April, which was the 90th anniversary of the alleged genocide315. 
A statement urging dialogue and compromise released by Brussels two days 
before the 90th anniversary of the alleged Armenian genocide came as a relief to 
Ankara316. Another relieving development for Turkey was that the US President George 
W. Bush did not use the word ‘genocide’ in an annual statement for the Armenian lobby 
and instead praised Erdoğan's proposal to establish a joint commission to study the 
genocide allegations317. 
Upon these developments, Armenian President Robert Kocharian sent a letter to 
Erdoğan stating that Yerevan accepted the earlier offer by Ankara to set up a joint 
research committee, but asking Ankara not to put forward any preconditions for starting 
talks. However, Turkey and Armenia failed to agree on conditions for taking steps to 
improve their non-existent ties, with Ankara calling for a academic study of Armenian 
allegations of genocide, whereas Yerevan insisted that political relations must be 
established first318. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled that Turkey could establish 
political relations with neighboring Armenia, while historians studied events during 
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1915 and 1918 in a bid to clarify whether Armenians during the Ottoman Empire were 
subject to a genocide campaign319. This raised Armenian expectations, which was 
reflected in Armenian Prime Minister Margarian’s words that the closed border with 
Turkey might be opened by the end of the year 2005320. 
Erdoğan declared that Turkey planned to launch a counter-attack on countries 
whose Parliaments recognized as genocide the 1915 killings of Armenians, while 
Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian urged the EU to put more pressure on Turkey to 
normalize relations with his country321. To Turkey’s relief, EU term president 
Luxembourg's Prime Minister Juncker made it clear that the EU could not 
become involved in the controversy over whether the killings of Armenians under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire early last century was genocide and that the issue should be 
left to the Turks and the Armenians322. 
In sum, AKP Government made a significant change of foreign policy by opening 
up all state’s resources related to Armenian allegations of genocide, and signaling to 
establish political ties with Armenia. 
 
Further in this chapter, foreign policy followed by the 58th and 59th Governments 
of Turkey until June 2005 will be described and analyzed according to the analytical 
dimensions drawn in Chapter 1. 
 
 
A: International Factors 
 
 
A.1. Change in Systemic Conditions 
 
One of the most important systemic developments since the end of Cold War is 
the issue of transatlantic relations, more precisely the growing gap between Europe and 
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US. Although Europe is not monolithic and still includes transatlanticist European 
countries like Britain, Italy and the new NATO members, anti-Americanism is a 
growing phenomenon across Europe. According to Robert Kagan, this is due to the 
major power gap between US and Europe. Thus, “Europe is moving beyond power into 
a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and 
cooperation”323, whereas  
…the United States…remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic 
Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true 
security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the 
possession and use of military might.324  
 
According to Robert Jervis, “the fundamental objective of the current Bush 
doctrine- which seeks to universalize U.S. values and defend preventively against new, 
nontraditional threats—is the establishment of U.S. hegemony, primacy, or empire”325. 
He argues that “the large European states have every reason to be concerned about US 
hegemony and seek to constrain it; they understandably fear a world in which their 
values and interests are served only at Washington’s sufferance”326. 
Turkish foreign policy during the AKP Government found itself at a point of 
choosing critical positions in this state of flux. Although problematic, Turkey tried to 
cooperate and support both US and Europe in a way, since Turkey has deep rooted 
relationships with both parties, which are based among many other factors also on 
economic interdependence. 
In September 2002, the US administration announced a new National Security 
Strategy in line with its unilateralist world view which has been gradually more 
apparent since Sept. 11th atrocities.  
It was notable for its declaration that the United States would act ‘preemptively’, 
using military force if necessary, to forestall or prevent threats to its security by 
terrorists or ‘rogue states’ possessing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons—
so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’.327  
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In November 2002 the Bush administration successfully lobbied for a UN Security 
Council resolution providing for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq, which 
according to US’ claims continued to possess weapons of mass destruction.  
For several weeks the United States and Britain tried unsuccessfully to secure 
support from France, Russia, and other Security Council members for a second 
resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, though 
administration officials continued to insist that earlier resolutions provided 
sufficient legal justification for military action. As debate in the Security Council 
dragged on, antiwar sentiment outside the United States increased dramatically, 
leading to massive peace demonstrations in several major cities throughout the 
world, especially in Europe.328  
 
Finally Bush ended up with a unilateral decision and ordered the War on Iraq, 
called Operation Iraqi Freedom, to begin on 20 March 2002. By mid-April US forces 
entered Baghdad and forced Saddam’s regime from power.  
Stabilizing postwar Iraq, however, proved difficult; in the months immediately 
after the war, one U.S. soldier, on average, was dying daily as a result of attacks 
by Saddam loyalists and other Iraqis opposed to the occupation. Meanwhile, 
hundreds of sites suspected of housing or producing Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction were investigated. As the search continued into the following year, 
critics of Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused both of having 
exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam in order to win public support for the 
war. Saddam, who had gone into hiding during the invasion, was captured by U.S. 
forces in December 2003.329 
 
2004 was the election year in the States. Bush focused his campaign basically on 
the war on terrorism, and succeeded to be reelected with a slim majority of the electoral 
and popular vote. Through reelection, however, Bush managed to gain a strong 
mandate, which can be interpreted as a public support to the continuation of US’ 
unilateralism. This was also reflected in the statements regarding Iran and Syria 
indicating that American hegemony was becoming more forceful and unilateral. 
In sum, systemic conditions during the post Sept 11 era reflected strong US 
dominance and unilateralism in world politics. However, this had no direct and viable 
impact on change of Turkish foreign policy in major issues such as Turkish-Greek 
relations or the Cyprus conflict.  
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A.2. Regional Developments 
 
The two important regional developments for Turkey during AKP government 
were the War on Iraq, and the EU enlargement.  
A.2. War on Iraq 
Underlining the fact that Turkey was one of the most effected countries from the 
First Gulf War, AKP Government made it clear from the beginning that they are in 
favor of avoiding of a second war on Iraq and for the resolution of the conflict under 
UN framework330. In the eve of the War on Iraq, Turkey hosted numerous high level 
officials and politicians who came to discuss Turkish support for the U.S. position 
against Iraq and in the anti-terror campaign. On 4 December 2002, US Deputy Defense 
Secretary Wolfowitz said that his country is looking at investing hundreds of millions of 
dollars to upgrade Turkish military bases that could be used in a war with Iraq331. 
Turkish Parliament approved a six-month extension of the Northern Watch, the mandate 
that allowed U.S. warplanes to use İncirlik air base to patrol a "no-fly" zone over 
northern Iraq332.While Turkey was refraining from concrete promises of support for a 
U.S. war on Iraq until initial results of United Nations weapons inspections are clear, 
John Taylor, the U.S. Treasury Department's undersecretary for international affairs, 
said that the United States and Turkey have agreed on the overall shape of an aid 
package to help Turkey's struggling economy withstand a possible war in neighboring 
Iraq, on 28 December 2002 after two-day talks in Ankara333. Turkey followed an active 
diplomacy to prevent a U.S.-led war in neighboring Iraq: Prime Minister Gül made a 
tour to Middle East countries Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and Kürşat Tüzmen, State 
Minister in charge of foreign trade, lead a Turkish business delegation to Baghdad, as a 
sign of Turkey's opposition to any war in neighboring Iraq. Tüzmen also delivered a 
letter to Saddam Hussein from Prime Minister Gül, appealing to Iraq to comply with 
UN resolutions to ward off a possible U.S.-led war334. Furthermore, the foreign 
ministers of Iraq's neighbors Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria meet in 
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İstanbul on 23rd January 2003 to discuss ways to avert a potentially destabilizing U.S.-
led war on Iraq. They urged Saddam Hussein to cooperate fully with U.N. arms 
inspectors to avoid a war that would have ‘devastating consequences’ on the countries 
of the region. Meanwhile, Iraq urged Turkey to reject U.S. requests for military support 
in any attack on Baghdad335. 
In the same period and almost contradictorily, upon AKP Government’s approval, 
U.S. inspectors began arriving in Turkey to examine military bases and ports in this key 
U.S. ally for a possible operation against neighboring Iraq, and the Turkish military 
began shipping additional military supplies to units along the Iraqi border to reinforce 
them ahead of a possible U. S. operation on Iraq336. In a key decision on 6 February 
2003, the Turkish Parliament voted to allow the United States to begin renovating 
military bases and ports for a possible Iraq war, a first step toward allowing U.S. 
combat troops into the country337, and on 8 February 2003, Turkey and the United 
States sign an agreement laying out the legal and financial framework for U.S. plans to 
renovate Turkish bases ahead of a possible war in Iraq338. While anti-war sentiments 
were growing in the Turkish public, another blow came from the European countries to 
Turkey’s potential support to US: France, Germany and Belgium split NATO by 
formally vetoing a plan to boost Turkish defense in the event of a US-led war on Iraq, 
an action U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounces as ‘a disgrace’. NATO 
called a special meeting of its 19 nations' envoys for an emergency meeting after the 
veto by three members. Turkey immediately requested emergency consultations under 
NATO's mutual defense treaty, the first time in the 54-year history of the alliance that a 
member nation formally invoked Article 4 of the founding treaty to force such talks339. 
Finally, on 19 February 2003, days after breaking a stalemate over planning in the event 
of war with Iraq, NATO, meeting without France, approved the urgent deployment of 
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AWACS radar aircraft, Patriot missile systems and chemical-biological response units 
to Turkey340. 
The United States offered Turkey an economic aid package that includes about $6 
billion in grants and up to $20 billion in loan guarantees in a bid to secure Ankara's 
support for an invasion of Iraq. On 25 February 2003, AKP Government asked 
Parliament to authorize the deployment of 62,000 US combat troops, 255 warplanes and 
65 helicopters, but disagreements on the conditions of the U.S. deployment delayed the 
key parliamentary vote. The bill also asked legislators to authorize the deployment of 
Turkish troops abroad341. On 1 March 2003, in a stunning reversal that could undermine 
U.S. war plans and seriously strain ties with Washington, Turkish Parliament failed to 
approve a motion allowing in U.S. combat troops to open a northern front against 
Iraq342. 
Signaling impatience with the Turkish government, the United States began 
moving Navy ships out of the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, where they could launch 
long-range cruise missiles on a path to Iraq that would not go over Turkey343, and U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell urged Turkey to keep its forces out of northern Iraq 
during any U.S.-led military action due to concerns of a possible conflict with the 
Kurds344. On 19 March 2003, the AKP Government asked Parliament to grant the US 
military permission to use Turkish airspace in an Iraq war, and in a long-delayed 
decision to give partial support to the United States to open a northern front against 
Iraq, Parliament finally voted to pass a government motion allowing the US to use 
Turkey's airspace for airborne attacks against Iraq345. 
Foreign Minister Gül declared that Turkey was determined to send its troops 
across the border into northern Iraq to contain a possible refugee flow and prevent any 
attempt by Iraqi Kurds to break away from Iraq346. However, both EU leaders and US 
                                                 
340 ibid.  
341 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.3 2003. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_02_03&fn=dom2.htm 
342 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.3 2003. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_09_03&fn=dom2.htm 
343 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.3 2003. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_23_03&fn=dom2.htm 
344 ibid.  
345 Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm 
346 ibid.  
 104 
Administration issued warnings to Turkey not to lead to further complications by 
dispatching troops to northern Iraq347. 
US officials said that the United States has scrapped plans to move U.S. troops 
through Turkey into northern Iraq and instead would send the 4th Infantry Division from 
Texas to Kuwait to join a thrust into Iraq from the south, and on 22 March 2003, US 
evacuated İncirlik Air Base in southern Turkey348. 
On 2 April 2003, Turkey and the US agreed on a basis for shipping supplies for 
US forces in northern Iraq through Turkey and to set up a coordination mechanism to 
avert possible friction in northern Iraq, in a major step to patch up ties damaged after 
Turkey's rejection of U.S. requests to deploy troops here349. Furthermore, Ankara 
declared having agreed in principle to a US request to send Turkish soldiers into 
neighboring Iraq for postwar peacekeeping duties. On 17 July 2003, Undersecretary of 
the Foreign Ministry Uğur Ziyal presented an extensive package of proposals for 
Turkish assistance to the US efforts to restructure Iraq in the aftermath of the war during 
his trip to Washington. Among the measures is a proposal to use part of an $8.5 billion 
U.S. loan to Turkey in the restructuring of Iraq350.  
In July 2003, a crisis occurred between Turkey and US, when American forces 
raided a Turkish Special Forces’ office in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya and 
detained 11 soldiers, reportedly on the grounds that the soldiers were plotting to kill the 
governor of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. An escalation of the crisis was averted when the 
United States eventually freed the Turkish soldiers, but in Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi 
Özkök’s words, this incident has created ‘the biggest crisis of confidence’ between 
Turkish and US armies. On 16 July 2003, the United States endorsed a statement 
expressing regret over the detention of Turkish soldiers351. 
On 22 September 2003, Turkish and US officials signed a long-awaited deal on 
the release of an $8.5 billion loan for Turkey. Upon that development, in October 2003, 
Turkish Parliament voted in favor of a government motion to send peacekeeping troops 
to neighboring Iraq, which was welcomed by the United States. However, next month, 
Turkey called off this offer to send peacekeeping troops, faced by a fierce opposition by 
the Iraqi Governing Council. 
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On 28 January 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the White House and Bush gave Erdoğan assurance that the 
United States would not support an expansion of autonomy for Kurds in neighboring 
Iraq. “I assured him of the United States' ambitions for a peaceful and democratic Iraq 
that is territorially intact”, Bush told reporters after the meeting352. 
In November 2004, after US President won a second term in office, Foreign 
Minister Gül said the U.S. presidential victory has provided US President an 
opportunity to review and fine-tune his much-criticized foreign policy, particularly on 
the Middle East and Iraq353. 
On 30 January 2005, Iraqis voted in their country's first free election in 50 years, 
which Turkey appreciated as a “step towards the establishment of a democratic regime” 
in the neighboring country354. Iraqi polls showed that Kurdish groups got the second 
largest share of seats in the Iraqi assembly after Shiite Arabs and a key role in the 
formation of the transitional government. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader 
Jalal Talabani declared victory in the ethnically mixed city of Kirkuk355. 
During her high-profile talks in Ankara in February 2005, US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice reiterated Washington's commitment to a unified Iraq and reassured 
Turkey that the U.S. would not tolerate terrorist groups in the country, in remarks likely 
to help patch up the strained ties between NATO allies Turkey and the United States356. 
Moreover, US Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman said Turkish-US relations have 
gone through ups and downs over disagreements on Iraq, but the relationship between 
the two allies was a strong one that cannot be reduced over just one issue357. 
Turkish Foreign Ministry dismissed criticism that Turkey's Iraq policy was shaped 
by concerns over the fate of Kirkuk and the rights of Turks' ethnic kin, the Turkmens. 
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The ministry claimed it had embraced a strategic perspective that covered all aspects of 
the Iraqi situation358. 
An opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal bluntly described what the writer 
termed a "poisonous atmosphere" that was disintegrating US-Turkish relations. On 18 
February 2005, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül played down this article that described 
Turkey as the ‘sick man of Europe’ reaffirming that the Turkish-US alliance had 
strategic importance for both sides regardless of what the Turkish or US media said359. 
In April 2005, Foreign Minister Gül said that the annual extension of 
permission for the use of İncirlik air base by a US-led coalition would meet an 
additional US request to benefit from the base as a logistics hub for operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan360, and later, the Turkish government approved this request about the 
use the İncirlik air. 
Jalal Talabani, the new president of Iraq, pledged to improve relations with 
Turkey in a broad range of areas and underlined that Iraqi Kurds wanted a united Iraq 
with a federal and democratic structure361. Iraq and its neighbors opened a two-day 
meeting in İstanbul, the first gathering since landmark elections in the war-torn country 
and the formation of an Iraqi interim government362. On 27 May 2005, in the first high-
level contact with the new Iraqi administration, Turkey and Iraq agreed to cooperate on 
a broad array of issues ranging from security to business ties in a sign of solidarity 
between the two neighbors363. 
In sum, during the AKP Government, the war in the neighboring Iraq occupied 
Turkey’s agenda for a very long time. Although Turkey was affected by the war in 
many ways, particularly related to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the war itself had no 
impact on other major foreign policy issues of the country such as the Cyprus conflict or 
Turkey-EU relations. 
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A.2. EU Enlargement: 
On 1 May 2004, EU welcomed ten new members to the Union.  
The latest enlargement, from 15 to 25, is the biggest in Union history. It has its 
roots in the collapse of communism, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, which offered an unexpected and unprecedented opportunity to extend 
European integration into Central and Eastern Europe.... The ten newcomers, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, joined formally on 1 May 2004, the culmination of a long 
process of preparation and negotiations....By the end of 2002 – less than 13 years 
after the break-up of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War – the eight 
central and eastern European countries had completed their negotiations and were 
ready to join, together with the two Mediterranean islands.364  
 
This development in the region was meaningful in the sense that “the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union finally heals the rift opened up by the East-West 
confrontation and the Cold War”365.  
Immediately after the collapse of communism around 1990, the European Union 
supported the democratization process in the former communist countries and 
provided technical and financial assistance as they introduced market economies. 
By the mid-1990s, trade agreements were in place, giving central and eastern 
Europeans preferential access to EU markets for most of their exports. Similar 
agreements with Cyprus and Malta date from the 1970s. The actual entry 
negotiations to agree the terms whereby the new EU countries assume the rights 
and responsibilities of membership took place between 1998 and 2002.  The entry 
date was set for 1 May 2004.366 
 
For Turkey, the 2004 enlargement was also significant, since [Greek] Cyprus 
became a full member. Thus, the EU enlargement had a positive impact on foreign 
policy change of Turkey concerning the Cyprus conflict. EU enlargement also affected 
positively Turkey-EU relations and Armenian issue. However, concerning the Turkish-
Greek relations, it had no impact on foreign policy change, since Turkey and Greece 
have already been in a rapprochement process since the earthquakes in 1999. 
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A.3. Foreign Commitments 
 
The most significant commitments Turkey realized during the AKP government 
were related to the pre-accession process to the EU.  
Concerning military commitments for European security, AKP continued with 
Turkey’s official position so far and favored a link between Turkey’s commitments to 
NATO and to the EU. This was reflected in Gül’s following words: “NATO is one of 
the most successful organizations in history. Another one is the EU… Strategical 
partnership between NATO and EU should be in line with improving European Security 
and Defense Policy”367. In December 2002, EU and NATO finally reached an 
agreement as the two accepted Turkey's demands on European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). “Turkey’s agreement to the comprehensive deal reached in December 
2002 regarding the participation of non-EU European allies in ESDP, opened the way 
for the finalization of the permanent arrangements between the EU and NATO and to 
the subsequent implementation of the Berlin Plus agenda”368.  
Along with its military foreign commitments to NATO, Turkey 
assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)369 in Kabul 
starting from February 2005, its second term leading the NATO-led troops since the 
force was established after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001370.  
Regarding the improvement of human rights records, AKP government led Turkey 
into significant legal commitments. In 2003, “Turkish Parliament ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights371 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights372 and Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms373”374, the latter banning the 
death penalty in peacetime, a symbolic move demonstrating Turkey’s commitment to 
human rights as it waits to open talks on EU membership. Peter Schieder, the Head of 
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, welcomed the move as ‘a step of huge 
political significance’375. In 2004, Turkey ratified Protocol No 13 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms376, eliminating capital 
punishment, also in wartime, as Turkey sought to meet EU membership criteria. Thus, 
in March 2004, the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary 
Assembly approved a special report recommending that Turkey be dropped from a list 
of countries monitored by the Strasbourg-based human rights watchdog for democratic 
deficiencies, a major stride in Turkey's efforts to join the European Union377. 
AKP government fulfilled a major and long awaited commitment to the European 
Court of Human Rights. In December 2003, settling a major dispute with the Council of 
Europe, Turkey paid 1.12 million Euros in an unprecedented gesture to compensate a 
Greek Cypriot woman Loizidou, for depriving her access to her property on the Turkish 
side of Cyprus as ruled by the European Court of Human Rights in a controversial 1998 
verdict378. 
On 12 May 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 1999 trial of 
terrorist PKK/Kongra-Gel leader Abdullah Öcalan, in which the now-defunct State 
Security Court (DGM) sentenced him to death for ‘treason through separatism’, was 
unfair because Öcalan was given insufficient access to the case files and because 
restrictions were imposed upon his lawyers during the trial process379. Currently, the 
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Justice Ministry is continuing to thoroughly evaluate the ruling of the European court 
for a retrial for terrorist PKK leader Öcalan380.  
In sum, the AKP Government’s major new foreign commitments were of legal 
nature and related to the pre-accession process to the EU. Fulfilling these commitments 
was crucial, since it reinforced foreign policy change in all major issues ranging from 
the Cyprus conflict, Turkey-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations to the Armenian 
issue. 
In this period, the factors regional developments (EU integration) and foreign 
commitments interacted with each other. 
 
 
B: Domestic Factors 
 
 
B.1. Domestic Regime Change 
 
As stated before, AKP came to office with a regular change of government 
through elections. 3 November 2002 Elections resulted with an overwhelming victory 
of AKP, so that AKP formed the 58th and 59th Turkish Governments as one-party 
majority government. 
AKP won a massive landslide victory capturing 34 % of the votes and 363 seats in 
Parliament in the elections. CHP was the only other party that managed to win seats in 
Parliament by gaining 19 % of the votes and 178 seats. Nine seats went to the 
independents. All the partners of the coalition government and the main opposition 
party were left out of the Parliament after having failed to clear the ten percent 
threshold. Previous Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit conceded defeat in national elections, 
saying his government committed political suicide by giving in to early polls381. 
The 28 March local elections in 2004 can be evaluated as a vote of confidence for 
the current AKP Government, where AKP scored a major victory, winning 
approximately 43 percent of votes. The result strengthened government’s mandate to 
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pursue more liberal economic and political reforms and gave it strength to push through 
the Cyprus road map382. 
Although there are occasionally rumors about early national elections, party 
officials dismiss such rumors, confirming the polls would be held on schedule on 3 
November 2007 with the AKP electing the next president in May of 2007383. 
In sum, AKP came to office with a regular exchange of power through democratic 
elections. However, the type of exchange was not applicable to foreign policy change. 
 
B.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy 
 
The AKP Government claims to pursue having a novel foreign policy vision, 
which Erdoğan repeatedly defined and described in his various ‘Call for Nation’ 
speeches as an “active, dynamic, decisive and calculative foreign policy”384 based on 
multilateralism. Erdoğan underlined that “Turkey would not reach anything by 
accepting deadlocks, following passive wait and see policies, creating paranoid fears, 
and isolating itself from the world”385. 
One basic characteristics of AKP’s foreign policy vision is that it is progressive 
instead of pro status quo: “We are not in an effort to protect the status quo neither in 
foreign nor domestic policies. This status quo needs to be changed. This [change] is a 
strategy itself, an accumulation of tactics. Therefore, we would never make a step 
contrary to our national interests. If we are about to make any step, we would contact 
first with the opposition, NGOs and with those circles who have a say in this matter, 
then we would take the necessary steps to be taken”386. In another speech on 22 January 
2004, Erdoğan states: “In a world that changes ever day, it is obvious that nothing 
would be gained with a static foreign policy understanding, with arguments that belong 
to yesterday and with strategies that were not updated. As government, we based our 
policies on this fact from the start, and we have put our foreign policy vision to the 
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front, that would move Turkey to the future and transform it into an influential and 
powerful world power”387.  
An unpublished group research388, where the author has personally participated, 
analyzed AKP Government’s Foreign Policy for the period from November 2002 until 
January 2004. The data used was composed of the statements and intentions of AKP, 
which were made public through mainstream newspapers and websites. A total of 1873 
entries were codified and categorized with the aim of examining the toolbox AKP 
applied while conducting its foreign policy. The research revealed that AKP 
Government relied on a combination of traditional diplomatic and conflict resolution 
tools: 59% of AKP Government’s foreign policy was composed of traditional 
diplomacy tools, while the remaining 41% of foreign policy activities belong to the 
conflict resolution toolbox389.  
In sum, AKP came to office with a different set of orientation to foreign policy, 
which is described as active, dynamic, decisive, and multidimensional by the party 
leader Erdoğan. Furthermore, AKP Government started to make use of problem solving 
approach in major foreign policy issues of the country such as the Cyprus conflict. This 
clear difference of AKP’s foreign policy orientation had a positive impact on foreign 
policy change. 
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B.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime 
 
AKP, using the advantages of being one party government and its high party 
discipline, shows a politically cohesive picture to a great extent. However, in some 
instances different voices have been heard, basically over domestic issues.  
In September 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's insistence on 
criminalizing adultery under the new Turkish Penal Code (TCK) framework was one of 
such instances390.   
In January 2005, debates regarding the best way to govern Turkey can be said to 
have dominated the agenda. The ruling AKP Government was divided by presidential 
system debates. While Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek was favoring a presidential system 
for permanent stability, AKP parliamentary group deputy leader Faruk Çelik, known for 
his close ties to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said that he personally preferred 
strengthening the parliamentary system to implementing a presidential system391. 
Rumors hinted that the AKP debates were not limited to the presidential system. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking at a meeting held at the AKP Central 
Executive Committee (MYK), mentioned the rumors of a Cabinet shakeup. “We are not 
going to change the Cabinet simply because the media wishes it. Necessary alterations 
can be made when and if the time comes,” said Erdoğan. Rumors include Erdoğan's 
desire to form a more united government by replacing some ministers who voiced his 
disagreement with certain government policies392.  
In February 2005, a Council of Europe commission report criticizing Turkish 
efforts in maintaining European standards of religious freedom sparked a debate within 
the ruling party over whether Turkey should keep a reference to religion on identity 
cards and continue compulsory religious classes in schools393. 
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Over differences of opinion with Erdoğan, Culture and Tourism Minister Erkan 
Mumcu resigned from both his Cabinet post and from AKP. His surprise resignation 
created a stir in a comparatively stable political environment394. 
In May 2005, Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç's statement that Parliament had the 
power to abolish the Constitutional Court if it deemed it necessary to do so has caused a 
major political controversy395. Furthermore, AKP parliamentary group discussed 
a headscarf case filed by Leyla Şahin at the European Court of Human Rights, with 
some deputies criticizing government arguments calling for a continuation of the ban396. 
In sum, despite some minor incidents, AKP Government proved to be highly 
cohesive in this period. This high degree of cohesiveness positively impacted foreign 
policy change. 
 
 
B.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime 
 
Opposition to AKP Government has been performed basically by three groups of 
actors: the main opposition party CHP, political parties outside the Parliament, and the 
powerful military establishment in Turkey. The strength of opposition of these groups 
has differed considerably. 
According to the election results CHP became the second party that entered the 
Parliament, and hence the main opposition party. Right after the elections, Erdoğan 
made a visit of good will to CHP leader Baykal and requested their support for the EU 
bid397. These mutual visits continued during both AKP Governments. CHP leader 
Baykal commented that “these visits constitute a message on their own; regardless of 
the topics discussed…We are working for developing a new common understanding 
concerning foreign policy”398.  
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In this period, CHP was basically occupied with its inner problems, so the 
opposition remained weak. “Ever since the elections the CHP… has been unable to 
meet the expectations of the Turkish left. Its popularity has continued to slide in each 
and every public opinion poll held since then. In the meantime, rather than 
cementing its unity – – for a change – – and concentrating its efforts on fulfilling its 
opposition role in Parliament, the CHP, under Deniz Baykal, turned more and more 
inward. A ‘Be it small, be it mine’ policy was pursued, and eventually all prominent 
personalities became disgruntled or expelled from the mainstream party of the Turkish 
left”399. Especially after local elections in March 2004, CHP leader Deniz Baykal 
received widespread criticisms and protests that his party has failed in polls400. In July 
2004, Deniz Baykal received a vote of confidence from 781 out of the 1,058 delegates 
in an extraordinary CHP convention401.  
Starting from November 2004, the reelected Şişli Mayor Mustafa Sarıgül from 
CHP “started a nationwide campaign to replace Baykal…Opposition to Baykal's rule 
saw a new chance to remove him in Sarıgül. As support for Sarıgül increased…, CHP 
leadership publicly blasted Sarıgül and two deputies were sent to Istanbul to investigate 
the charges of corruption. Their report was the basis of the application submitted to the 
CHP Supreme Disciplinary Board (YDK) that asked for Sarıgül's dismissal from the 
party…It was on Jan. 3, 2005, that the YDK surprisingly took the decision to reject the 
application to dismiss Sarıgül from the party. Soon after, Baykal released a statement 
calling for an extraordinary party congress sometime in January”402. 
“CHP … is undergoing a transformation. If it's successful, we'll have a truly social 
democrat party. The CHP will be free from its Kemalist past and will lose its identity. 
Mustafa Sarıgül is being used to realize this transformation. … It seems the criticism is 
focused on the CHP's nationalism. In fact, while the CHP sincerely supports EU 
membership, it has adopted a Kemalist nationalist and republican stance with respect to 
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Cyprus (and most probably soon for the Aegean Sea as well) and minorities. It tries not 
to deviate from moderate secularism”403.  
On 5 February 2005, the 13th extraordinary party congress of the CHP was held in 
Ankara, and resulted in the victory of Baykal who collected 674 while the mayor won 
460 votes404. Later, Baykal’s rival Mustafa Sarıgül was dismissed by the party's 
Supreme Disciplinary Board (YDK), where he was charged with violating party bylaws 
during the congress405. 
Similarly, parties outside the Parliament were also very much concerned with their 
inner dynamics rather than performing a strong opposition to AKP. 
Following the 3 November 2002, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, DYP leader Tansu 
Çiller and ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz stepped down as the leaders of their parties after 
defeat in elections. In December 2002, DYP elected Mehmet Ağar as its new leader at a 
general convention. In January 2003, Ali Talip Özdemir, is elected leader of ANAP, 
which later changed leader and elected Nesrin Nas as its first female leader of the party. 
In October 2003, MHP re-elected Devlet Bahçeli as its chairman.  
In December 2003, former Prime Minister and veteran politician Bülent Ecevit 
announced that he would step down as leader of DSP at the party's convention 
scheduled to be held after local polls. On 25 July 2004, ending an active political career 
that spanned nearly half-a-century, he stepped down from the leadership of his center-
left DSP. Delegates later elected Zeki Sezer, a former Cabinet minister, as their new 
leader. 
In February 2003, Cem Uzan, one the closest rivals of AKP during the elections, 
was re-elected GP leader. He had to deal with business problems, partly caused by 
AKP. In June 2003, the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry announced it has 
canceled deals with two power distributors, namely Kepez Elektrik and Cukurova 
Elektrik, controlled by the controversial Uzan group and seized the plants operated by 
these two companies. The ministry says the companies have persistently violated 
provisions of the concession agreements they have signed with the government to run 
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power stations and distribute electricity406. In July 2003, the Banking Supervision and 
Regulation Agency (BDDK) canceled the banking license of İmar Bank owned by the 
controversial Uzan group, a day after it seized control of its management407. Moreover, 
the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK) decided to halt the broadcasting of 
television channels owned by GP leader Cem Uzan, for using the broadcasts in favor of 
unjust benefit for the TV station owner408. In August, after calling on leading 
telecommunications equipment maker Motorola for arbitration talks over a multi-billion 
dollar dispute, the Uzan family resigned from the board of Telsim, the number two 
mobile operator in Turkey409. In February 2004, Turkish authorities backed by police 
take over management of some 219 companies owned by the controversial Uzan Group 
in order to collect on the group's estimated $6 billion in debt to financial authorities410.  
Chief of General Staff evaluated AKP’s electoral victory as the realization of the 
public’s choice411. Erdoğan argued: “Our military does not mix into politics. The area of 
authority of the military is defined by the Constitution. Concerning security our military 
has a defined area of duty; similarly the area of duty of the institution of politics is also 
defined”412.   
However, the EU institutions were not satisfied with the level of military 
involvement in Turkish politics. One example for that was that the European 
Parliament's committee on foreign affairs in its annual assessment report on Turkey 
declared that the Turkish military constituted an obstacle to the development of a 
democratic and pluralist political system in the country413. 
In May 2003, Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök refused to even mention the 
word ‘coup’, acknowledging that the military had concerns about some of the actions 
                                                 
406 Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm 
407 ibid.  
408 ibid.  
409 ibid.  
410 Turkish Daily News. Year 1. 2.1.2005. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2737 
411 AK Parti MYK’sı Toplandı. 5.11.2002 http://www.akparti.org.tr/  
412 Erdoğan İsveç Başbakanı Goran Persson'la Bir Araya Geldi. 27.11.2002 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/ 
413 Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm 
 118 
and applications of the AKP government but stressed that these could be solved through 
dialogue between institutions414. 
On 30 July 2003, Turkish Parliament passed the seventh harmonization package 
concerning EU reforms; a landmark legal reform to curb the political influence of the 
powerful military415. On 7 May 2004, in an effort to advance Turkey's bid to join the 
EU, the Parliament cast a 457-8 vote to approve a set of constitutional reforms that 
would abolish State Security Courts (DGMs) and introduce civilian supervision over 
military expenditures416. 
Although the strength of military in political affairs was limited by various 
parliamentary decisions, still the powerful presence is felt over controversial issues. In 
March 2005, a statement from the General Staff released after local celebrations called 
Nevroz, during which some Kurdish groups were seen dragging the Turkish flag on the 
streets, underlined that the Turkish Armed Services was determined to defend the 
country and its flag to the last drop of blood, just like its forefathers, warning those who 
misinterpreted its patience and aloofness417. Similarly, following the casus belli policy 
discussions in the Aegean Sea, Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ said 
tension and incidents that could occur around the country would have a harmful effect 
on the unity of the nation, calling on people to allow authorized institutions to handle 
any provocative or illegal acts418. Another example came in April 2005, as the Chief of 
General Staff Hilmi Özkök signaled that the conditional support of the powerful 
military for Turkey's EU membership bid could wane, if the country continued to be 
pressured for further concessions on Cyprus and if the EU allowed itself to be used as 
an intermediary by the PKK in dictating to Turkey the PKK's separatist demands 
wrapped in the form of cultural rights419. 
In addition to the opposition parties and the military, the President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer displayed some sort of opposition by using his veto power during the AKP 
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government. The President holding a veto record among Turkish Presidents so far has 
returned 32 bills of the current government headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan420. 
Despite the weakness of the opposition, an important note on the AKP 
government relations vis a vis opposition is that the current government appears more 
willing than previous governments to provide information to Parliament, though 
only after the issues under discussion are somewhat finalized either by the Foreign 
Ministry or at the government level421. 
In sum, the opposition’s strength varied from actor to actor. However, this factor 
had no direct impact on foreign policy change in the major issues of Turkey. 
 
B.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues 
 
Substantive differences of opinion and a high level of polarization were revealed 
concerning the Cyprus conflict. Previous Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel accused 
Erdoğan for contacting Greek Prime Minister Simitis before the 3 November 2002 
Elections confirming that the Cyprus Conflict and Turkish-Greek problems would be 
solved more easily. These accusations were denied by AKP422. 
In December 2002, Erdoğan, making AKP’s position clear, urged a solution in 
Cyprus and attacked hardliners in Turkey, saying they deserved criticism because of a 
40-year failure to formulate a solution423. The sides of the polarization became obvious, 
when veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş replied that he would step down, if 
Turkey pressured him to accept the Annan Plan, what he considered an unacceptable 
deal to reunite Cyprus, but he carefully added that he had not yet seen any such pressure 
from Turkey424. Erdoğan continued to call for a shake-up of Turkish policy on Cyprus 
and urged Denktas to take Turkish Cypriots’ protests against his rule into 
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consideration425. As a response to AKP’s pressures, Denktaş threatened Erdoğan by 
saying that Turkey should find another negotiator to replace him, if it disagreed with his 
stance426. Turkish Land Forces Commander Gen. Yalman declared a UN peace plan to 
unite Cyprus could be a recipe for violence, providing crucial backing for Turkish 
Cypriot leader Denktaş427. Hence, Denktaş rejected the revised Annan Plan, raising the 
tension by describing it as ‘trickery’ and ‘sleight of hand’428. 
Before the elections in Northern Cyprus, the debate between AKP and Denktaş 
heated up again. In September 2003, Foreign Minister Gül said that Denktaş should win 
the support of the Turkish Cypriot people. Gül made this statement in response to 
Denktaş’s claim that he would continue struggling for the Cyprus cause by rallying the 
support of the mainland Turkish people, even in the event of an election defeat429. 
Despite AKP’s clear position for ‘yes’, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş 
campaigned for a ‘no’ vote in the 24 April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan430. 
Before the upcoming presidential elections in Northern Cyprus, Denktaş 
criticized the AKP’s policy on Cyprus and said that his disagreement with the AKP 
government was the reason he had decided not to seek a new term as president431, 
whereas Erdoğan justified his government’s pro-settlement stance, which was publicly 
attacked by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş432. Siding with Denktaş, CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal visited Northern Cyprus to show appreciation and gratitude to veteran leader 
Rauf Denktaş, before he handed over the Presidency to Talat433.  
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the Öcalan Case 
in 2005 was another example where foreign policy issues became highly polarized. 
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Before the decision was officially announced, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli warned if 
Öcalan were to be retried, it would cause a public outcry, adding that the domestic 
supporters of terrorism would try to incite ethnic provocation434. CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal said it is unacceptable for Turkey to tolerate such a decision, if it ordered that 
Öcalan should be retried, criticizing the AKP government's nonchalant attitude 
towards the anticipated decision of the on the retrial of Öcalan435. Opposition parties 
were united in their criticism of the government after the European court's decision that 
Öcalan's trial was unfair436. 
Whereas State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Şahin from AKP defended 
that Öcalan decision was a matter that should not be exaggerated, CHP continued to 
criticize the AKP government's submissive stance towards ECHR’s decision437. The 
issue was further polarized as the Members of the Martyrs' Mothers Association and 
ultra-nationalists staged small-scale protests across Turkey protesting the European 
Court's ruling that the 1999 trial of the terrorist PKK leader Öcalan was unfair438. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reversed the criticisms diverted to AKP by 
stating that previous governments were to blame for violations of the rights of terrorist 
PKK leader Öcalan, accusing those who criticized his government for not doing 
enough to ensure the European court ruling favored Turkey439. 
In sum, Cyprus conflict and Öcalan case were the major polarized issues. 
However, the study did not reveal a direct impact of the level of polarization on foreign 
policy change. 
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B.6. Regime Vulnerability 
 
Concerning the regime vulnerability during the AKP government, two traditional 
fault lines in Turkish politics need to be taken into consideration. The first one is the 
Kurdish issue; the second one, political Islam.   
Concerning the Kurdish issue, the AKP government found itself in a relieved 
atmosphere due to the decrease of separatist terrorist activities after the capture of 
Öcalan, so AKP could realize and implement numerous reforms concerning the Kurdish 
minority.   
As early as November 2002, Turkey's broadcasting authority authorized state 
radio and television to air limited programs in the once-banned Kurdish language, a step 
toward meeting EU membership requirements440. In addition, Turkey ended curfews 
and restrictions on gatherings in two predominantly Kurdish provinces, Diyarbakır and 
Şırnak, ending 15 years of emergency rule in southeastern Turkey and fulfilling a 
requirement toward joining the European Union441. 
At the beginning of 2003, Turkish Parliament adopted a bill paving the way for 
the retrial of former imprisoned pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) deputies, 
including Leyla Zana, as part of a second reform package aiming to harmonize with EU 
laws442. 
In July 2003, overturning a veto by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, AKP 
managed to pass the sixth harmonization package including the proposed elimination of 
Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law that has been criticized for limiting freedom of 
expression443. The same month, a partial amnesty law was accepted, a move which the 
government expected to pave the way for disarmament and the return to Turkey of a 
significant number of PKK terrorists, mostly based in northern Iraq, in exchange for less 
severe punishment444.  
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Despite the announcement of PKK/ KADEK of an end of a five-year unilateral 
cease-fire with Turkey first in 2003445 then again in 2004446, AKP continues with the 
reforms. In September 2003, the Interior Ministry issued a circular, ordering local 
authorities to allow Kurdish families to give their children Kurdish names447. In 
November, Turkish authorities allowed Kurdish writers from Iran, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, 
and Sweden to convene a conference in the southeastern province of Diyarbakir in their 
own language for the first time in 20 years448. 
On 14 March 2004, the first school to teach Kurdish opened in the southeastern 
province of Şanlıurfa, two years after Parliament passed a law allowing such schools449. 
On 7 June 2004, Turkey began long-delayed broadcasts in ethnic languages, first 
airing 30-minute programs in the Bosnian language. Short programs in Arabic, 
Circassian and two Kurdish dialects, Zaza and Kirmanji, were also scheduled to air on 
state radio and television450. 
Same month, the Supreme Court of Appeals ordered the release of Leyla Zana and 
three other Kurdish ex-deputies from Ankara's Ulucanlar prison451. 
As the polarization over ECHR’s decision on Öcalan case increased in April 2005, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan underlined AKP’s position that the terrorist PKK/Kongra-Gel 
and the Kurds of Turkey should not be confused with one another452. 
In May 2005, the event that the Turkish flag was dragged through a street during 
the local Nevroz celebrations escalated the tension over the country’s Kurdish minority. 
Furthermore, General Staff’s statements that terrorist infiltration into Turkey was 
                                                 
445 Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm 
446 Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 6.6.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_06_04&fn=dom2.htm 
447 Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm 
448 ibid.  
449 Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 21.3.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_21_04&fn=dom2.htm 
450 Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 13.6.2004. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_13_04&fn=dom2.htm 
451 ibid.  
452 Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005. 
http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986 
 124 
continuing453, and an armed struggle with the outlawed PKK has resumed within 
Turkey454, created concerns.  
Concerning regime vulnerability, the political Islam issue also proved to be 
problematic for the AKP government. 
As early as January 2003, the powerful military accused Prime Minister Gül of 
encouraging ‘anti-secularist activities’ in its first public attack on the new 
government455. 
On 23 April 2003, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, high-ranking generals of the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and main opposition party CHP leader Deniz Baykal 
boycotted a traditional reception in protest over women's use of Islamic-style 
headscarves, highlighting tensions between the ruling AKP and the secularists456. 
In August 2003, Supreme Military Council (YAS) decided to sack 18 officers and 
noncommissioned officers for pro-Islamic leanings despite reservation from Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan457. 
In September, another conflict highlighted clashes between the governing party, 
and the secular establishment, as the Court of Appeals’ chief judge Özkaya commented 
that the proponents of ‘limitless religious freedom’ are united with supporters of an 
Islamic state458. 
In October 2003, powerful military warned about the government plans to reform 
religious imam-hatip schools. “We have difficulty understanding why the number of 
graduates from the imam-hatip schools should increase from the current 25,000”459, said 
Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Basbuğ. 
On 29 October 2003, almost all the deputies in the ruling AKP, except for the 
Cabinet members, boycotted the official Republic Day Reception marking the 80th  
                                                 
453 Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.5.2005. 
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anniversary of the foundation of modern Turkey, after President Sezer refused to invite 
their wives, many of whom wear Islamic-style headscarves460. 
In November 2003, Turkey was shaken with two Islamic terrorist attacks 
connected with al-Qaeda terror network. The first one occurred on 15 November, as 
suicide bombers detonated truck bombs nearly simultaneously outside two synagogues 
in İstanbul filled with worshippers, killing at least 25 people and wounding 303 
others461. On 20 November, trucks packed with explosives blew up near the 
headquarters of the London-based HSBC Bank and British Consulate General in 
İstanbul. This second set of attacks killed at least 27 people and wounded more than 
400. British Consul General Roger Short was among those killed462. 
In February 2005, a student amnesty bill that would benefit hundreds of thousands 
of students who were expelled from universities since 2000 was passed by the 
Parliament463, after causing many debates whether the bill included those who were 
expelled due to the headscarf issue.  
The headscarf debate heated again in May 2005, as Constitutional Court Chief 
Justice Bumin declared that any attempt to lift the headscarf ban would violate the 
Turkish Constitution and the European Charter of Human Rights, which created turmoil 
at the top of the state hierarchy. 
CHP leader Deniz Baykal and Higher Education Board (YÖK) Chairman Erdoğan 
Teziç urged government members to refrain from making provocative statements on the 
issue of the headscarf ban and claimed that Bumin’s comments had been referring to 
legal facts. 
In sum, regime vulnerability was low during the AKP Government due to the 
ceasefire of the PKK. Thus, the decrease of Kurdish separatism threat made it easier for 
AKP to initiate and/or implement foreign policy change. Low regime vulnerability 
reinforced foreign policy change in this period. 
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C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process 
 
 
C.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity 
 
This study has not encountered any evidence or indication reflected in the mass 
media suggesting that there was a conflictual issue between the foreign policy 
bureaucracy and the AKP government. Thus, the bureaucratic rigidity factor was not 
applicable to foreign policy change. 
 
C.2. Leadership Dynamics 
 
The strength and influence of AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership was 
clearly evident by the process that eventually led him to the Prime Minister seat. The 
charismatic and popular party leader Erdoğan was not able to enter the Parliament 
initially, since he was legally banned from elections.  
As early as 9 January 2002, the Constitutional Court ordered the leader of AKP, 
Erdoğan, to step down as a founding member. On 17 April 2002, a national television 
broadcasted the video tape recording of the speech Erdoğan made in Rize province in 
1992, criticizing the Turkish Armed Forces, politicians and the secular regime. The 
chief prosecutors of both the Ankara State Security Court (DGM) and the Erzurum 
DGM, and the chief prosecutor of Rize province, decided to examine the video cassette. 
On 19 April 2002, The Constitutional Court declared that Erdoğan would not be eligible 
to run for Parliament because of a prior conviction for inciting religious hatred. The 
then Chief of General Staff Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu accused Erdoğan of ‘spitting hatred’ 
against the military. AKP leader referred to the statements of Kıvrıkoğlu as to ‘cast a 
shadow on Turkish democracy’. 
This was not the only accusation diverted to Erdoğan. On 24 May 2002, the AKP 
leader gave an hour-long deposition in an inquiry into whether he may have breached a 
Turkish corruption and bribery law after newspapers report that he has a fortune of $1 
million. On 6 June, the acting chief prosecutor in Ankara formally charged the popular 
leader Erdoğan with illegally accumulating wealth, adding to the politician's legal woes. 
Furthermore, on 26 July 2002, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office filed a suit 
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against 18 suspects, including Erdoğan, on charges of "bidding fraud" regarding the 
billboard tenders of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.  
At the beginning of September 2002, the Diyarbakır State Security Court cleared 
the criminal record of AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, enabling him to run in 3 
November polls. According to this decision, the Criminal Records Office announced 
that Erdoğan’s records were erased. However, the Court of Cassation served a deadly 
blow to the ambitions of AKP leader Erdoğan to become the country's next prime 
minister. The court upheld the ruling of the Diyarbakır State Security Court refusing a 
demand by Erdoğan’s lawyers that the criminal record be cleaned because the amended 
Penal Code Article 312 no longer included the crime for which he was sentenced. The 
controversial Article 312 regulated penalties for crimes against the state; furthermore, 
both the Constitution and the elections law stipulate that people sentenced under that 
article cannot run for public office even if pardoned. Finally, on 20 September 2002, the 
High Electoral Board ruled that Erdoğan could not run on 3 November due to his 
conviction on former charges. In October, Erdoğan stepped down as founding member 
of his party, remaining as chairman, in line with a recent decision of the Constitutional 
Court. Still, he could not avoid that a party closure case was filed against AKP on 
grounds that the party didn't completely obey the decision of the top court when it kept 
Erdoğan as its chairman. Starting from 1 November 2002, the Constitutional Court 
began examining the petition to ban AKP. The Court gave the party 15 days to prepare a 
defense against a case to block party leader Erdoğan from being party head and thus 
relieved the party before the crucial parliamentary elections464. 
However, his presence was highly sensed also during the first AKP Government. 
AKP Central Executive Board (MYK) endorsed Erdoğan with full power to determine 
the Prime Minister465, who made his choice for Abdullah Gül. Gül and Erdoğan worked 
in full harmony, so that Gül continued as Foreign Minister in the 59th Government as 
well. 
In December 2002, the Supreme Elections Board (YSK) decided to cancel 
elections in the southeastern city of Siirt and the Parliament, overturning a presidential 
                                                 
464 The course of events leading to Erdoğan’s ban from the Parliament is extracted from 
Turkish Daily News, 2002 in Perspective, 01.05.2003. 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=polit
ics.htm 
465 AK Parti MYK’sı Toplandı. Arşiv. 05.11.2002 http://www.akparti.org.tr/ 
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veto by Sezer, made constitutional amendments that paved the way for AKP leader 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to become Prime Minister466. 
By January 2003, Erdoğan was acquitted on charges of irregularities regarding his 
earnings and assets467. 
On 9 March 2003, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won a seat in Parliament by 
a massive margin in Siirt by-elections, and on 14 March, he was formally appointed 
Prime Minister to lead Turkey’s 59th government. 
The closure case against the AKP was dropped on 25 March 2003468.  
In October 2003, preparing to mark its first year in office, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
was unanimously re-elected by delegates in AKP’s first convention. Erdoğan’s 
leadership and popularity remained unchallenged since then. 
Thus, AKP leader Erdoğan represents a strong leadership with extensive electoral 
and delegate support. Moreover, Erdoğan’s unchallenged leadership and AKP’s high 
political cohesiveness reinforce each other. Thus, during the AKP Government, the 
factor leadership dynamics had a positive impact on foreign policy change. 
 
C.3. Decision-making Process 
 
During the AKP Government, the 1982 Constitution is still in force. Thus the 
basic foreign policy decision-making mechanism and major foreign policy actors have 
remained the same as before. However, in accordance with EU demanded reforms, AKP 
was able to pass from the Parliament some significant legislative changes that altered 
the civilian-military balance at National Security Council (MGK) in favor of civilians 
and that created a transparency to this institution.  
On 15 January 2003, the Parliament approved a bill amending the National 
Security Council (MGK) law in line with a prior constitutional amendment. With the 
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new amendment, Deputy Prime Ministers and the Justice Minister became MGK 
members, while the MGK decisions will be counted as ‘recommendations’469. 
On 10 December 2003, the Parliament approved a bill designed to lift the secrecy 
surrounding the personnel and work of the military-dominated National Security 
Council (MGK), as a move undertaken as part of Turkey's efforts to catch up with the 
EU standards470. 
In conclusion, there have been significant legislative changes related to the foreign 
policy decision. However, the study revealed no impact of this factor on foreign policy 
change. 
 
                                                 
469 Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.1.2003. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Findings of the Comparative Case Study 
 
 
The comparative case study at hand rests upon the assumption that there has been 
a foreign policy restructuring in contemporary Turkish foreign policy with the current 
AKP Government, i.e. a major difference from its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition. The following analysis summarizes the case findings and shows, which of the 
analytical dimensions drawn in Chapter 1, affected Turkish foreign policy of both 
governments.  
Dependent variable foreign policy change was evaluated according to the 
following evaluation criteria: (1) positive impact suggests that the factor affected 
foreign policy change positively, i.e. induced it. (2) no impact means that the factor did 
not affect foreign policy change at all, i.e. the factor neither reinforced nor weakened 
foreign policy change. (3) negative impact suggests that the factor affected foreign 
policy change negatively, i.e. led to the continuity instead of change, and, (4) not 
applicable means, although drawn from the literature, that a factor revealed irrelevant to 
determine foreign policy change.  
The following table summarizes case findings according to the evaluation criteria 
defined above: 
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Table II: Summary Table of Findings along the Analytical Dimensions of 
Analysis 
 
 CASE I 
DSP-MHP-ANAP
 
COALITION 
CASE II 
AKP 
GOVERNMENT 
A. International Factors 
a.1. Change in Systemic 
Conditions 
No impact No impact 
a.2. Regional Developments 
       Kosovo / War on Iraq 
       EU Enlargement: 
                     Cyprus conflict 
                     TR-EU relations 
                     TR-GR relations 
                     Armenian issue 
 
No impact 
 
Negative impact 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
No impact 
 
No impact 
 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
No impact 
Positive impact 
a.3. Foreign Commitments: 
                     Cyprus conflict 
                     TR-EU relations 
                     TR-GR relations 
                     Armenian issue 
 
No impact 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
No impact 
 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
Positive impact 
B. Domestic Factors 
b.1.DomesticRegime Change Not applicable Not applicable 
b.2. Different Orientations to 
Foreign Policy 
Negative impact Positive impact 
b.3. Political Cohesiveness of 
the New Regime 
Negative impact Positive impact 
b.4. Strength of Political 
Opposition to the Regime 
No impact No impact 
b.5. Level of Polarization 
over Foreign Policy Issues 
No impact No impact 
b.6. Regime Vulnerability Negative impact Positive impact 
C. Political Agency and Decision-making Process 
c.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity Not applicable Not applicable 
c.2. Leadership Dynamics Negative impact Positive impact 
c.3. Decision-making Process No impact No impact 
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A: International Factors 
 
a. 1. : DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government’s tenure corresponded with the late 
years of Clinton era and the first years of Bush’s Presidency. In this period, a 
remarkable change in systemic conditions occurred from multilateralism towards 
unilateralism due to the handover of the American Presidency especially following the 
devastating Sept. 11th attacks. However, the research revealed no impact of this factor 
on foreign policy change during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, which continued to 
follow its foreign policy on traditionally sensitive issues such as the Cyprus conflict, 
Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey-EU relations and the Armenian issue regardless of 
changes in systemic conditions. 
AKP government’s tenure corresponded with the period, when President Bush 
was hardening his unilateralist approach, and the transatlantic relations were worsening, 
particularly due to the War on Iraq. However, despite these changes, AKP’s foreign 
policy was not affected by the systemic conditions. The study revealed no direct impact 
of this factor on Turkey’s foreign policy change. At this point, it is important to note 
that Turkish Parliament’s rejection of a motion that would have allowed the opening of 
a Northern Front from Turkey caused considerable tension in US-Turkey relations. 
However, aside from this significant incident, AKP government’s policies remained 
impervious.  
In sum, findings suggest that change in systemic conditions had no impact on 
foreign policy change pursued by either DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition or AKP 
government. 
a. 2. : Concerning regional developments, important developments occurred both 
during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and AKP Government.  
War in Kosovo and EU enlargement process were the two main regional events 
during the coalition government. Although Turkey was fully supporting the US led 
NATO operation in Kosovo, this development had no further impact on foreign policy 
change of Turkey in other issues. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the EU’s 
enlargement process was continuing at good speed, whereby Turkey’s candidate status 
was acknowledged at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 as well. The 
EU enlargement process had a mixture of types of impacts in various issues of Turkish 
foreign policy. While it was a catalyst factor and thus had a positive impact concerning 
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Turkish-Greek relations and relations of Turkey with the EU, it did not affect the 
Armenian issue. Moreover, it had a negative impact concerning the Cyprus conflict, 
since [Greek] Cyprus was also one of the candidates, which led to a toughening of 
Turkish foreign policy in this issue.  
For AKP Government, the two important regional developments were the War on 
Iraq and again the EU enlargement. Although the war in the neighboring Iraq dominated 
Turkey’s foreign policy agenda for a long period, the study revealed no direct impact of 
it on a change concerning other major foreign policy issues. However, findings showed 
that EU enlargement process had a mainly impacts on various issues. It had a positive 
impact on foreign policy change regarding the Cyprus conflict, Turkey-EU relations and 
the Armenian issue. Changes of Turkish foreign policy in the context of the resolution 
attempts of Cyprus conflict were remarkable. Parallel to the developments on the island 
and in full conformity with the UN efforts, Turkey made a dramatic shift in its position 
by fully supporting the Annan Plan at the expense of polarization with Denktaş. The 
conciliatory approach of AKP on the island represented a noteworthy deviation from the 
status quo approach followed by Turkey until then. EU enlargement had no particular 
impact on Turkish-Greek relations that continued to improve. 
In sum, the analysis indicates that regional developments’ impact on foreign 
policy change can be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
a. 3. : DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition as well as AKP Government continued to fulfill 
the political, economic, legal and military foreign commitments of Turkey towards 
outside actors. For both periods, commitments in EU context played a significant role. 
During the coalition government, the National Program was on the top of the agenda. 
The current AKP Government overwhelmingly dealt with legal commitments for 
advancing in the pre-accession to the EU such as the abolishment of death penalty. 
Similar to regional developments, foreign commitments varied in their impact on 
foreign policy change along various issues. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, 
except for the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, where they had no impact, they 
led to change both in Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations. On the other 
hand, foreign commitments had a positive impact on foreign policy change in all four of 
the above mentioned major issues. 
This analysis concludes that as in the case of regional developments, the impact of 
foreign commitments on foreign policy change can be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
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B: Domestic Factors 
 
b. 1. : Both governments came to office through regular elections. 18 April 1999 
Elections resulted in the formation of a coalition between DSP, MHP and ANAP, three 
different parties with different worldviews. 3 November 2002 Elections on the contrary 
showed an overwhelming victory of AKP and led to the formation of a one party 
government in Turkey after decades. However, the analysis for these two cases reveals 
that the domestic regime change factor was not applicable to foreign policy change.  
b. 2. : Concerning different orientations to foreign policy, DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition did not present a wholesale new set of orientation with the exception of 
rapprochement of relations with Greece. For the general conduct of foreign policy 
during this period, it can be said that a status quo approach was followed, which 
included carrot and sticks policies. On the contrary, the study revealed that AKP 
Government came to office with a totally new set of orientations to foreign policy 
defending a dynamic, proactive, multidimensional and multilateral approach stimulated 
by a liberal worldview and conflict resolution approach. 
The analysis shows that different orientations to foreign policy had a positive 
impact on Turkish foreign policy’s change during the AKP Government, whereas the 
lack of them had a negative impact for the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, i.e. led to 
continuity in foreign policy.  
b. 3. : DSP-MHP-ANAP Government was a coalition government based on the 
compromise of these three coalition partners. However, this compromise was not 
functioning smoothly in many cases concerning domestic as well as foreign policy 
issues. Coalition partners found themselves at odds with each other particularly on the 
Öcalan case and Turkey-EU relations. Political cohesiveness of the DSP-MHP-ANAP 
proved to be so low that the coalition eventually dissolved due calling of one of the 
coalition partners, MHP for early elections.  
On the contrary, AKP Government showed a considerably high degree of 
cohesiveness. Although some different voices were heard in a few issues, for the most 
part, the Government stood firmly and unequivocally behind the policies followed. 
The analysis concludes that political cohesiveness had a positive impact and 
contributed towards foreign policy change in AKP case, whereas the coalition suffered 
from a low degree of cohesiveness that led to continuity in foreign policy. 
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b. 4. : The political opposition’s strength varied from actor to actor, but generally 
proved to be low in both cases. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the main 
opposition party FP was dealing with its closure case and inner turmoil for party 
leadership posed by the reformist wing that eventually dissolved and formed the AKP. 
Military and President continued to be strong actors in foreign policy making. In 
general, the coalition had no major disagreements with the powerful military 
establishment, but concerning the EU demanded reforms, the coalition’s efforts were 
slowed down by military’s opposition. Although President Sezer was elected during this 
period with coalition parties’ support, the relations between Sezer and Ecevit got so 
tense that triggered an economic crisis initiated by this political crisis.  
During the AKP Government, the main opposition CHP was also dealing with the 
inner party politics, particularly with Sarıgül’s quest for party leadership. Thus, the 
opposition was weak to perform a strong opposition towards AKP. Military and 
President continued to be strong in this period as well: AKP- military relations proved 
to be more problematic due to the moderate Islamist roots of the party and strictly 
secular character of the powerful military establishment. The President Sezer showed an 
opposition to the governmental policies in many instances by using his veto power 
granted by the Constitution. However, AKP could overcome presidential vetoes through 
its firm majority in the Parliament. 
The analysis reveals that the low strength of political opposition had no impact on 
foreign policy change during both DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and AKP Government.  
b. 5. : During the coalition government, the level of polarization got high 
concerning the Öcalan case and Turkey-EU relations, whereas AKP Government faced 
polarization basically over Cyprus conflict. However, in both cases, there was not a 
change in foreign policy due to the level of polarization, so the analysis shows that the 
low level of polarization had no impact on foreign policy change. 
b. 6. : The regime vulnerability sources for DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition were 
being a coalition government, continued problems concerning the Kurdish issue and 
economic crises. The high level of vulnerability, i.e. the potential risk of losing the 
government, led in this case to a continuity of status quo policies. During the AKP 
Government, regime vulnerability decreased considerably concerning the Kurdish issue, 
so the government could more easily legislate and implement some reforms without 
facing this major threat, but a new source of vulnerability was evident for the AKP case: 
the Islam issue. The pro Islamist character of AKP created unfavorable conditions 
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between the party and the secularist military and President. However, this tension was 
rather limited to domestic issues such as the headscarf issue and did not affect AKP’s 
foreign policy considerably. 
In sum, high regime vulnerability had a negative impact on foreign policy change 
during the DSP-MHP-ANAP, whereas the lessening of it had a positive impact and led 
to foreign policy change during the AKP Government.  
 
C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process 
 
c. 1. : Concerning bureaucratic rigidity, in both cases, the study did not reveal 
sufficient data. Thus, this factor was not applicable to foreign policy change.  
c. 2. : During the AKP Government, the charismatic leader Erdoğan enjoyed solid 
support from his Cabinet and party members. Thus the leadership dynamics in the AKP 
case created favorable conditions supporting the change in foreign policy, whereas 
Ecevit’s leadership was not as strong as Erdoğan’s, so the previous government had to 
deal constantly with intra coalition problems among the leaders, which led to 
compromise policies, and thus to a continuity of the status quo. In other words, strong 
leadership in AKP had a positive impact on foreign policy change, whereas the 
relatively weak leadership of the coalition had a negative impact. 
c. 3. : For both periods of government, the 1982 Constitution draw the basics of 
the foreign policy decision making. However, for the case of DSP-MHP-ANAP 
coalition, the role of military was more obvious due to its strong influence through 
National Security Council MGK. AKP Government, relying on its strong parliamentary 
support was able to increase the number of civilians in the MGK and created more 
transparency of this institution. However, findings revealed no major impact of 
decision-making process on foreign policy change. 
 
Conceptual Refinements 
 
Based on the comparative case findings above, it appears that domestic factors 
have most influenced foreign policy change.  
Among them, regime vulnerability is one of the most crucial environmental 
factors: a highly vulnerable regime is more likely to preserve the status quo in foreign 
policy, rather than taking the risk of making major changes. On the contrary, the relief 
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of threats to the regime encourages governments to initiate and implement foreign 
policy changes.  
The two other domestic factors, different orientations to foreign policy and 
political cohesiveness of the new regime have also an underlying impact on foreign 
policy change:  
The first one is different orientations to foreign policy. A government with a new 
set of foreign policy orientations is more likely to realize a foreign policy change, 
whereas the lack of different orientations to foreign policy again leads to continuity in 
foreign policy. The nature of the new orientation, i.e. conflict resolution oriented or 
traditional diplomacy oriented is not a determinant factor by itself but is meaningful 
within the whole package. 
The second one is the political cohesiveness of the new regime. A high degree of 
cohesiveness provides favorable conditions for foreign policy change, while less 
cohesive and fragmented governments find it difficult to make such changes.  
Political cohesiveness and leadership dynamics are factors that reinforce each 
other’s effect. A strong leadership is more likely to secure cohesiveness compared to a 
weak leadership. The study exposes that strong leaders have a positive impact on 
foreign policy change, whereas weak leaders lead to continuity in foreign policy. 
It is important to note that the study shows that the low political opposition and 
polarization, as well as decision-making process have no major impact on foreign policy 
change. Furthermore, the factors of domestic regime change and bureaucratic rigidity 
are not applicable to foreign policy change in this research. 
Among the international factors, regional developments and foreign commitments 
deserve special attention. Both of these factors are issue specific and highly situational, 
meaning some regional developments and foreign commitments can have a positive 
impact on foreign policy change on specific issues, while others can affect foreign 
policy change not at all or even negatively. Thus, the study reveals that the impact of 
regional developments and foreign commitments can be evaluated on a case by case 
basis. At this point, it is also important to add that foreign commitments are not a 
decisive factor, but become meaningful when they are considered with other factors 
such as regional developments. 
The study shows that change in systemic conditions have no immediate impact on 
foreign policy change for the period under inquiry.  
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Concluding Remarks provide a brief account of the factors that lead to change and 
continuity. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of the study provide the following schemas for foreign policy change 
and continuity. 
Figure III summarizes the package of factors that have a positive impact on 
foreign policy change: 
Figure III: Factors for Change 
Environmental 
Factors 
Low Vulnerability 
Actor specific 
Factors 
Different  
Orientation 
High 
Cohesiveness 
Strong 
Leadership 
Issue specific 
Factors 
Regional Developments + Foreign Commitments 
 
 
FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
 
Thus, low regime vulnerability, parallel with a different orientation to foreign 
policy, a high level of political cohesiveness, and a strong leadership, all positively 
impact foreign policy change. Regional factors and foreign commitments can interact 
and be meaningful depending on the nature of the development.  
Figure IV summarizes the factors that have a negative impact on foreign policy 
change, i.e. that lead to continuity. 
Figure IV: Factors for Continuity 
Environmental 
Factors 
High Vulnerability 
Actor specific 
Factors 
Lack of Different  
Orientation 
Low 
Cohesiveness 
Weak 
Leadership 
Issue specific 
Factors 
Regional Developments + Foreign Commitments 
 
 
FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY 
 
Thus, high regime vulnerability, parallel with the lack of a different orientation to 
foreign policy, a low level of political cohesiveness, and a weak leadership, all 
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negatively impact foreign policy change. Regional factors and foreign commitments can 
interact and be meaningful depending on the nature of the development.  
 
Discussion  
 
This thesis is based on the assumption that there has been a foreign policy change 
in Turkey with the current AKP Government in office, as compared to its predecessor 
DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. This change was particularly evident in the traditionally 
“sensitive” policy areas such as Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey- EU relations, the 
Cyprus conflict, and the Armenian issue. AKP Government governing Turkish foreign 
policy since 3 November 2002 Elections made bold steps in the above mentioned policy 
areas. While using the traditional diplomatic toolbox, AKP brought to the scene a novel 
rhetoric and Conflict Resolution oriented policies. These novelties are especially 
observed in the context of the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue. 
The study aims to analyze the causes and dynamics of this foreign policy change. 
For this purpose, analytical dimensions drawn from the foreign policy restructuring 
literature are applied in form of a comparative case study to both cases, i.e. DSP-MHP-
ANAP coalition, and AKP Government. Despite the limitation that the types of 
governments under inquiry are different, one being a coalition, the other a single party 
government, the selection of cases was aimed as to reflect the change aspect by 
selecting subsequent governments. Furthermore, this choice of selection made it 
possible to highlight current Turkish foreign policy. 
In contemporary Turkish foreign policy, the analysis shows that domestic factors 
influence foreign policy change the most. Regime vulnerability is the key 
environmental factor that affects change or continuity of foreign policy. Low regime 
vulnerability positively impacts change. The findings of the study as discussed above in 
length, basically confirm with Hagan’s findings (1994) who wrote on domestic factors’ 
effect on foreign policy change. Both studies endorse that foreign policy change is most 
likely to occur when political actors with different orientation came to power and enjoy 
a high cohesiveness. The findings of the current comparative case study also point out 
to the mutual reinforcement of strong leadership and high cohesiveness. Regional 
developments and foreign commitments are issue specific, thus, can interact and be 
meaningful depending on the nature of the development. 
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